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ABSTRACT 
 
For nearly a decade now, Morocco has stood as a pillar of U.S. democracy promotion in 
the Middle East and North Africa.  This has been a result of a number of factors such as 
Morocco’s historical accessibility to the United States, a young pro-U.S. monarch who is 
seemingly a reform-enthusiast, and the highly advertised U.S. goal of democratizing Arab 
nations in the post 9/11 era.  However, there have been studies that have focused on particular 
aspects of U.S. policies toward Morocco and have indicated mixed results.  The more critical 
works suggest that democracy is not a desired goal of U.S. policy toward this North African 
country.  Others suggest that the methods chosen are ineffective even though the goal might be 
an earnest one.  The least critical observers suggest democratic gradualism as being the essence 
of U.S. policy on Morocco.  In this study, I have delved into the question of U.S. democracy 
promotion in Morocco through a comprehensive analysis of the various dimensions of the 
superpower’s policy.  Using a theoretical framework derived from the liberalization-versus-
democratization model of Daniel Brumberg and the rhetoric-versus-reality model of Glenn E. 
Perry, I conclude that while some degree of democratization is facilitated, the existing structure 
of the political system in Morocco is ultimately reinforced.   
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PREFACE 
 
The foreign policy of the Unites States, for several decades has revolved around the buzz 
word “democratization.”  This word has been evoked time and again, whether in the battle 
against the communist world, in the battle against particular regimes in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA), or in the war on terrorism following the September 11
th
 attacks in 2001.  
In order to contribute to studies of U.S. democracy promotion in the MENA, this research delves 
into the Moroccan case.  Being the closest “Arab” state to the West—geographically and perhaps 
politically—Morocco makes for a particularly interesting case.   One would imagine the U.S. 
democracy promotion in this country to be less affected by other variables, such as oil-politics, 
or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Moreover, Morocco has been frequently praised by the West 
for its democratic progress.  These attributes of Morocco prompt the central question of this 
thesis:  What effect does the U.S. policy in Morocco have on the democratization of the latter?   
Derived from theories established by Joseph Schumpeter,
1
 as well as Robert A. Dahl,
2
 the 
definition of democracy in this study focuses on two dimensions—contestation and 
inclusiveness.  In Schumpeter’s view, one that has been most commonly referred to by American 
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 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (London:  George Allen and Unwin, 1943), 269.  
2
 Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy:  Autonomy vs. Control (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 
1982), 11. 
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social scientists,
3
 democracy refers to the institutional setup that accords power to individuals to 
influence decision-making through a competitive process for the people’s votes.  Dahl’s 
“polyarchy” (commonly referred to as democracy) is a system of governance where the power to 
make decisions is vested in elected officials, who are chosen periodically by the adult citizenry 
through a fairly conducted electoral process.  There are also additional conditions that must be 
present according to Dahl’s theory, for democracy to exist. These include the citizens’ right to 
run for governmental offices, to express freely on political matters,  access to alternative sources 
of information that are protected by law, and to form independent associations, independent 
political parties and interest groups.
4
  Therefore, democracy is defined here as a system in which 
political decisions are made by officials who are periodically elected by the adult citizens, who 
are also granted the freedom of expression, press, and the right to form independent associations.   
In the current literature on U.S. democracy promotion, Marina Ottaway and Thomas 
Carothers have noted that the United States is bound—in its policy toward MENA states—by a 
combination of interests that are inherently at conflict with one another, and that democracy does 
not rank highly in importance.
5
  Katerina Dalacoura on the other hand holds that, in the U.S. 
perspective there are two categories of Arab states—the friends and the foes.  Dalacoura has 
found that Washington’s democracy promotion voice is raised in the case of “foes,” but not so 
much with “friends.”6  Glenn E. Perry has provided a framework of viewing U.S. democracy 
promotion policies in the MENA through a dichotomous lens—the superpower’s rhetoric on the 
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vi 
subject versus the reality of depending on authoritarian regimes as allies in the face of popular 
opposition to its policies. Perry’s study describes the interplay between the normative and the 
rational.
7
 
Focusing on the Maghreb states (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia,) Yahia H. Zoubir 
reiterates that Morocco is the pillar of U.S. activity in North Africa.
8
  Zoubir has found that U.S. 
interests elsewhere in the MENA are in fact a driving force in the superpower’s interests in this 
Maghreb country.  However, he has also suggested that economic factors including U.S. 
competition with the European Union (EU), for influence, might play a role as well.  The 
findings in a study by Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley indicate that U.S policies might result 
in a degree of liberalization at certain levels of the Moroccan political system.  However, 
democracy as such is not facilitated by these policies
9—a finding that is in line with Daniel 
Brumberg’s distinction between political liberalization and democratization.10 
In the current study, I have attempted to engage in a comprehensive qualitative analysis 
of U.S. policies in Morocco in the post 9/11 era.  I have divided U.S. policies into two 
categories—policies of “democracy” promotion, and policies of regime maintenance.  I have 
then analyzed three major reform initiatives undertaken by the Moroccan monarch in addition to 
other minor moves that are democratic in nature. While the two categories of U.S. policies are 
opposite in nature, there is a net effect that tilts heavily toward one side—regime maintenance.  
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My findings suggest that U.S. policies may promote political liberalization not as a step toward 
democracy, but rather as a substitute for it.  It also emerges that in the current scheme of politics, 
U.S. promotion of democracy as such remains largely within the realm of rhetoric, while it is 
inhibited in reality by conflicting interests.  Additionally, I suggest that it is possible that the U.S. 
democracy promotion policy is at work for a larger interest—the transformation of the 
population’s psychology from the current degree of pro-Islamist and anti-U.S. leaning to 
something more favorable.  If successful, such a change would make democracy in Morocco less 
threatening to U.S. interests and security concerns.  
The facts and figures pertaining to U.S. assistance to Morocco were obtained from 
primary as well as secondary sources.  Much of the information on democracy assistance as well 
as military and security alliance were collected from U.S. governmental documents and websites 
of U.S. agencies. Likewise, key points on the Western Sahara issue were derived from 
congressional committee reports.  In addition, congressional research service (CRS) reports and 
scholarly works have served as secondary sources.   
This thesis is divided into five chapters.  In Chapter 1, I have provided an overview of 
theories on U.S. democracy promotion in the MENA. This is followed by a summary of the 
evolution of U.S. interests in Morocco, leading into the turn of the millennium, which is the 
period of focus for this study.  In the next chapter, facts, figures, and details pertaining to U.S. 
democracy assistance to Morocco are presented and discussed.  Chapter 3 includes evidence 
pertaining to “regime maintenance”—U.S. policies on military and security assistance, trade, and 
Western Sahara.  In Chapter 4, I have examined the democratizing initiatives undertaken by the 
Moroccan regime, and the U.S. influence in such policies.  In this chapter I have also provided a 
detailed analysis of the stakes and interests of the United States in Moroccan democratization.  
viii 
The thesis concludes with Chapter 5 in which I have detailed the observations and findings of 
this study.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
BACKGROUND, THEORIES, AND THE EVOLUTION OF U.S.-MOROCCO RELATIONS 
 
Introduction 
For nearly a decade, Morocco has been viewed as one of the most promising candidates 
in the U.S. democracy promotion mission—laden with complexities as it may be—in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA.)  Officials in the U.S. government and international observers 
frequently praise King Mohammed VI for his impressive portfolio of political reforms in 
Morocco, which in the West are received as signals of democratization.  This portrayal, however, 
is contested by theories emerging from scholarly works on the MENA, that identify 
contradictions to democratization, both within U.S. policies on this region as well as in the 
reform initiatives undertaken by Arab leaders.  Following an overview of the theoretical 
influences on this study, this chapter sheds light on the nature of relations between the United 
States and Morocco, as a bouncing-off point for the analyses that follow in subsequent sections 
of this thesis.   
  
2 
The Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical premises that inform and influence this study are drawn from the works of 
Daniel Brumberg
11
 and Glenn E. Perry.
12
  Brumberg has noted an important distinction between 
political liberalization and democratization.  While political liberalization has been viewed as a 
stepping stone toward democratization, it often does not occur as a phase in a linear path toward 
democracy.  Instead, it sometimes ends up as the destination of a country’s journey to pluralism, 
as is most often the case in MENA states.  Liberalization gives a ruler the capability to coopt 
opposition movements that may otherwise gain grounds among the broader population of a 
country, independent of the state.  By opening up the political platform to such forces, the ruler 
absorbs the opposition which in turn enjoys a sense of wielding influence in policy making.  The 
key however is that the ruler retains authority and ultimate power where it really matters for the 
survival of the regime and the current form of political system.  Nevertheless, by taking the 
approach of inclusivism, the ruler in effect negotiates with the opposition and builds a consensus 
wherein both parties benefit to a higher degree than they would in the absence of such a deal.  
The former gains legitimacy—both domestic and international—for being more inclusive, and 
the latter gains a modest degree of power to influence legislation, which if nothing else, serves as 
an avenue to release some of its urge to oppose. According to Brumberg, such political 
liberalization in a semi-autocratic system reinforces the existing power structure, turning the 
state into a “liberalized autocracy.”13 This conceptual separation of liberalization from 
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 Ibid, 3. 
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 Perry, Imperial Democratization, 55-87. 
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 Brumberg, Democratization Versus Liberalization in the Arab World, 9. 
3 
democratization serves as an analytical tool while examining the prospects of democracy in 
Morocco.
14
 
Providing an additional dimension to the study of U.S. democracy promotion, Glenn E. 
Perry offers a theoretical framework that projects this phenomenon through a dichotomous 
lens—the rhetoric versus the reality.15  The “rhetoric” here is the proclaimed role of the United 
States as a patron of democracy in the MENA, particularly in the post-9/11 era.  The “reality” on 
the other hand refers to the superpower’s need to maintain certain “client-regimes” in the region, 
in order to pursue its material interests.  What is described here is the contest between idealism 
and realism, in which the former takes the backseat to the latter, although less blatantly and in a 
rather masked manner than pure realism would call for.   This aspect of Perry’s theory fits the 
constructivist view that policies of realism are often carried out under a normative blanket 
established by policymakers themselves, made up of ideals that garner them legitimacy 
domestically as well as abroad.  In the case of the MENA, the United States finds it no longer 
wise to blatantly support friendly authoritarian regimes, as the seriousness of its legitimacy 
deficit abroad became apparent as airplanes flew into U.S. skyscrapers.  However, this new 
realization does not take away from the reality of the need for pro-U.S. client-regimes in the 
region that happen to be invariably autocratic in nature.  Hence, a complex game of active 
“democracy promotion” is played, in which the rhetoric is superficially met by policies of 
                                                 
14
 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” in Journal of Democracy, 13, no. 1, (2002): 5-21.  The 
discourse in this work is complementary to Brumberg’s distinction between political liberalization and 
democratization.  Carothers identifies the theoretical weaknesses of the “transition paradigm” which has long 
assumed political liberalization to be a part of a three-step process—opening, breakthrough, and consolidation—of 
transition to democracy.  
15
 Perry, Imperial Democratization, 58. 
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modest and limited political liberalization in MENA states, while in reality, this announced 
policy is laden with obstacles posed by the “imperial imperatives” of realism.16 
The relevance of these theories to this thesis is unraveled as this study of the Moroccan 
case progresses. As will be seen in the following section of this chapter, there is many a reason 
that would dictate the U.S. government to maintain its friendly ties with the regime.  Do such 
reasons mar the justice that the United States can do to its “democracy promotion” rhetoric?  The 
answer to this question is derived from analyses that follow in this thesis.   
 
The Evolution of U.S.-Morocco Relations 
In order to analyze the scope of U.S. democracy promotion in Morocco, it is important to 
understand the dynamics of the relationship between the two countries, as the superpower’s 
policies are likely a product of a complex matrix of considerations.  While the Maghreb region—
comprised of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco (although at times is stretched to include Libya and 
Mauritania)—has been considered by scholars to have been of less consequence hence of less 
interest to the United States than the more narrowly defined Middle East,
17
 Morocco has been an 
exception since the early stages of its independence. In this section, I identify the evolution and 
key stages in this relationship, placing emphasis on post-Cold War developments, the Free Trade 
Agreement, and Morocco’s status as a major non-NATO ally of the United States.   
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 Yahia Zoubir and Karima Benabdallah-Gambier, "The United States and the North African Imbroglio:  Balancing 
Interests in Algeria, Morocco, and the Western Sahara," in Mediterranean Politics 10, no. 2 (2005), 181. 
5 
Pro-American Tendencies 
Throughout history, U.S. policymakers have regarded Morocco a stable Arab state that 
has proven to be congenial to American interests during sensitive times. It is also frequently 
touted in congressional committees that the country has been a reliable ally since the creation of 
the United States, as Morocco was the first nation to officially recognize the latter as a sovereign 
state. The first diplomatic post and the longest one to have been occupied by the United States in 
a foreign territory, has been in Morocco, dating back to 1821.  The United States also has its 
oldest peace treaty (1787) with Morocco. These historical facts become relevant in the current 
study of the dynamics of the U.S-Morocco relationship for the simple reason that policymakers 
regularly refer to past relationships as they pursue matters pertaining to North Africa in the 
twenty-first century.
18,19,20 
During the Cold War, under the rule of King Hassan II, Morocco served as a key ally to 
the United States in containing the spread of communism, and it was a recipient of American 
economic and military assistance. With the end of the Cold War, the strategic value of Morocco 
temporarily declined, leading to a decrease in such assistance, which congressional budget 
limitations contributed to. This trough in U.S.-Morocco ties soon took a turn at the advent of the 
Gulf war of 1991, during which Morocco once again demonstrated its pro-American leanings by 
supporting the war and sending two thousand Moroccan troops to Saudi Arabia.
21
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 Committee on Foreign Affairs.  “U.S. Policy Challenges in North Africa.”  U.S. House of Representatives.  First 
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The next period of heightened U.S. interest in Morocco resulted from the tumultuous 
situation in Algeria. In the 1990’s, Algeria was plagued by a decade long internal conflict, while 
the government was struggling to survive and religious extremism was on a steep rise. This 
eruption of radical Islamism that hovered over much of North Africa and Europe came with 
staunchly anti-Western sentiments. This was yet another chapter in the U.S-Morocco connection, 
when Morocco successfully played its role as “America’s Pillar in the Maghreb”22 by thwarting 
the radical Islamist threat and preventing it from damaging American and Western interests in 
the region. The regime once again benefited from strong American support to prevent the 
propagation of radical Islamism. What is noteworthy here is that, the containment of radical 
Islamism in Morocco was achieved by King Hassan II by the use of soft and somewhat 
legitimate means of repression rather than brutal force.
23
 The traditional legitimacy claimed by 
the Moroccan monarch, who holds the title “Commander of the Faithful”—widely accepted 
among his  population—enabled Hassan II to institutionalize the emerging Islamism.24  In doing 
this, the monarch was able to personally set constraints to its scope, channeling it away from the 
fiercely anti-Western posture prevalent in Algeria’s radical groups.  Within such limits, minority 
Islamist groups were allowed to continue activity in the country. Thus to Western observers, 
Morocco reinforced itself as a conservative religious bulwark against radical Islamism. It is for 
reasons such as these that successive U.S. administrations, of both political parties, have viewed 
Morocco as a steady and close ally as well as a protector of Western interests. To the United 
States, the events of the 1990’s also set the stage for the desirability of a persistently stable 
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 Zoubir, American Policy in the Maghreb, 3. 
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 Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier, The United States and the North African Imbroglio, 188.   
24
 Campbell, Morocco in Transition, 40. 
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Moroccan government, as the Algerian example had demonstrated the chaotic and threatening 
consequences of destabilization. 
 
U.S. Interest in a Stable Morocco  
Another major policy arena where the United States has bestowed its support on Morocco 
pertains to the Western Sahara issue.  Morocco occupies eighty percent of Western Sahara, and 
has throughout the conflict (since 1975) insisted on its sovereignty over the territory.  This 
conflict has involved in its geopolitical dimensions the independence seeking Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic (SADR), Morocco, its North African neighbors (Algeria and Mauritania), 
its European neighbors (Spain and France), and—more relevant to this study—the United States.   
Among the Western powers, while France has directly sympathized with the Moroccan 
view of the conflict the United States has adopted an official stance that is much more 
ambivalent.  The United States in theory has supported the United Nations Charter that 
guarantees the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people.  On the other hand, as a more 
rational actor than an idealistic entity, its political and economic imperatives dictate policies that 
are contradictory to this stance, making for a classic case of the ‘rhetoric versus reality’ 
dichotomy.
25
  The U.S. rationale has fluctuated in various directions in connection with the 
political currents on the international world stage.  During the Cold War, deterring Soviet 
expansion was the key American focus.  Although there not being any Soviet nurturing of the 
Sahrawi nationalist movement, the United States feared the potential spread of Marxist and 
Leninist ideologies in the territory, and in the worst case scenario, the emergence of a pro-Soviet 
state in Western Sahara.  This perceived potential threat skewed the U.S. position vis-à-vis the 
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 Perry, Imperial Democratization, 55. 
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Sahrawi conflict in favor of Morocco, leading to a revived arms sales policy to Morocco aiding 
in its war in the desert.  
In the aftermath of the Cold War and the years of crisis in Algeria, the realities have 
changed, consequently influencing the U.S. rationale regarding the Western Sahara conflict.  The 
new reality that marks this era is the U.S. policy of thawing its relationship with Algeria as the 
latter is no longer viewed as a revolutionary state hostile toward American interests or Morocco.  
This shift in its international relations has enabled subsequent U.S. administrations to adopt a 
more even-handed policy toward the Western Sahara conflict, in that there is relatively more 
vocalized support for the United Nations settlement plan and self-determination for the Sahrawi 
people.  The political phenomenon here resonates with the constructivist view that norms and 
realities change; while states may be self-interested, they continuously re-define what that 
means.
26
  Insofar as the rhetoric and reality are not at a stark contradiction with one another, a 
superpower can afford to abide by its announced principles, such as the right to independence of 
the SADR in Western Sahara.  However, in spite of supporting the settlement plan, the United 
States remains unswerving in its commitment to ensure a stable, secure Morocco, and one whose 
political climate is not disrupted by the unpredictability of a new sovereign state to its south.  As 
a result, in its dialogue with Morocco, the U.S. position on the conflict has seamlessly morphed 
into a support for an autonomy plan charted and proposed by Morocco according to which it 
would ultimately retain its sovereignty over the currently “occupied territory” as it is viewed by 
many.
27
  This U.S. position on Western Sahara is enhanced in the current decade as the strategic 
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 Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics.  
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value of Morocco and the American stakes in the region have become all the more intensified in 
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11
th
 (9/11), 2001. 
 
The 9/11 Ripple Effect? 
The factors discussed in the preceding section have positioned Morocco as a key ally in 
the western Mediterranean region in the U.S. fight against Islamist terrorism.  Morocco in turn 
has demonstrated its capability as well as cooperation in curtailing radical Islamism in the 
region—with U.S. and European assistance. It should be noted that Morocco is not the only 
Maghrebi state recruited by the United States in its team approach to combatting terrorism.  The 
larger scheme of U.S. strategy calls for the development of a closer partnership in the entire 
Maghreb region on the economic, military and security fronts.  This would enable the United 
States to secure a comprehensive North African cooperation.  In 2004, the United States 
military’s U.S European Command (EUCOM) organized a two-day joint meeting summoning 
the heads of the three Maghrebi states’ armed forces in conjunction with those of the Sahel states 
(Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger, and Senegal) to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts.  
Nonetheless, what enables Morocco to continue holding its unique position with the United 
States is the contrasting incongruity in Algerian and U.S. stances on a number of key issues.  
Algeria’s positions regarding Western Sahara, the Israeli-Palestinian question, and Syria, to 
name a few remain in opposition to that of the United States.  Therefore, the relatively thawed 
U.S.-Algeria relations are confined in scope to the security sector and hydrocarbons.
28
  In 
addition, the states of the surrounding Sahel region are relatively of less vitality as compared to 
Morocco, in terms of the U.S. political initiatives in the broader MENA.  Thus the post 9/11 
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 Zoubir, American Policy in the Maghreb, 10. 
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politics have significantly strengthened the U.S.-Morocco bilateral ties that now include the 
landmark free trade agreement (FTA) of 2006
29
 and the designation of Morocco as a major non-
NATO ally of the United States.    
 
The Free Trade Agreement 
On March 2, 2004, the United States and Morocco reached a free trade agreement (FTA), 
which came into effect in 2006.  According to the Congressional Research Service, this FTA is 
intended to strengthen the bilateral relationship between the two countries, elevate trade and 
investment flows, and bolster Morocco’s position in the MENA as a moderate and flourishing 
Arab state.
30
  Analysts and scholars have viewed this agreement through varied lenses.  To some, 
the FTA reflects U.S. economic interests in the region and no more; whereas to others the 
agreement is a part and parcel of the U.S. political agenda in the MENA.  However, an analysis 
of congressional documents and committee reports suggests that to the U.S. policymakers, this 
step was a milestone in one of the most valued alliances in the MENA and a means to realize an 
array of future gains in the region politically, economically, and security-wise.   
 
Key Provisions 
Perhaps as a prelude to the U.S.-Morocco FTA, Morocco had undertaken a series of 
accelerated economic reforms and the liberalization of the market consisting of large scale 
privatizations.  In doing so, Morocco also signaled its willingness to diversify its economic 
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 Migdalovitz, Morocco:  Current Issues, 5. 
30
 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. Morocco-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, by Raymond J. 
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partners.  Such economic policies are exactly what the United States upholds as its ideological 
objectives and promotes in the international scene.  Hence it is no surprise that Morocco won 
increased American support on the economic front.  The key provisions of the U.S.-Morocco 
FTA are discussed below. 
One of the fundamental clauses of the FTA is the opening of barriers to more than 95 
percent of the trade between the two countries.  The main sectors targeted by the agreement are 
Moroccan agricultural imports and textile exports, the U.S. financial sector and 
telecommunications.  The FTA makes provisions for facilitating the establishment of U.S. 
financial firms in Morocco, opening of the Moroccan insurance market to American products, 
and in telecommunications a mutual commitment to non-discrimination for the users of the 
existing networks.
31
  In addition to the economic concerns, the FTA addresses environmental 
policies, labor conditions, and social rights.  It also contains clauses that deal with administrative 
transparency and ‘good governance’, though not directly imposing steps toward democratization 
in Morocco.   
 
Economic Gains 
During the initial debate in the U.S. government over the decision of a U.S.-Moroccan 
FTA, questions were raised regarding the benefits of such an agreement, to the United States in 
particular.  In response, the Bush Administration, backed by a coalition of U.S. companies that 
support this agreement, stated that it would serve U.S. interests on the economic and the political 
fronts.  Although the current study is concerned with the political implications of U.S. policies, 
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 From the U.S.-Morocco FTA official document available online at:  http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
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democratization in particular, the economic stakes of this agreement should be explored also, as 
these are often the motivating forces behind political decisions and outcomes.  From the 
American perspective, there are a number of economic benefits to be reaped, which have been 
identified and taken into account by policymakers, according to congressional reports.
32
  One 
benefit pertains to the U.S. versus European Union (EU) dynamic.  In the context of the 
international political economy the EU is one of the foremost competitors of the United States.  
Throughout the past decades, it is the EU that has been Morocco’s primary economic focus, 
partly because the two entities are neighbors, and also as a continuation of their historical 
relationship, notably colonization.  In addition, Europe had already signed a trade agreement that 
would give it preferential access to Morocco. By entering into an FTA with Morocco, the United 
States gains a certain leverage in its economic position vis-à-vis the EU.
33
  Secondly, the average 
tariffs faced by U.S. exports (20%) will be decreased and gradually even eliminated, thereby 
expanding two-way trade flows between the two countries.
34
  A third benefit would be increased 
access that American firms will have to a variety of Morocco’s service sectors.  In addition, the 
agreement is viewed by the United States as an essential building block for its broader and long 
term objective in the MENA—the establishment of a regional free trade area.  A fifth economic 
benefit that is of a much more global scope, at least as purported by the Bush Administration, is 
the positive advertisement for the U.S. trade strategy of “competitive liberalization.”35  In other 
words, policymakers believe that the U.S-Morocco FTA could demonstrate to the developing 
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world the benefits of economic reforms and liberalization, and also promote the benefits of the 
World Trade Organization’s Doha Development Agenda.    
 
Political Gains 
According to the officials at the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) office, one of the 
primary goals of the Moroccan FTA is to promote the economic growth and political progress of 
this long-time ally in the MENA, and to shape it as a model of openness, tolerance, and 
moderateness.  Some scholars as well as government officials view the FTA as also a reward for 
persistent cooperation with the United States in the war against Islamist terrorism and an 
incentive for further joint efforts.
36,37,38
  Secondly, the trade agreement with the United States is 
believed to effect economic growth and prosperity in Morocco, which could lay the foundation 
for the eventual emergence of a full-fledged democracy.  What is interesting in this reasoning is 
that it suggests that a fully democratized Morocco will indeed be a political gain for the United 
States as compared to the status-quo.  This point will be elaborated and analyzed in later 
chapters.  A third perceived benefit is that economic growth based on trade and foreign 
investment would foster mutually friendly attitudes among the two countries, which would not 
only be limited to the regime level in Morocco but also extend to the popular level.  In addition 
such prosperity would help reduce poverty and conditions of despair which is a proven formula 
of a fertile breeding ground for terrorists.  Finally, by signing an FTA with Morocco, the United 
States could potentially earn goodwill in other parts of MENA.  One reason is that the United 
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States indirectly signals that it is willing to enter into partnerships in the MENA beyond just 
Israel and its neighbors (the U.S.-Jordan FTA).
39
  This would hold true to the extent that there 
are positive outcomes for the population of Morocco.   Assuming that such benefits do 
materialize, Morocco could serve as an example for other countries in the region which might be 
persuaded to follow suit and may adopt similar political stances toward the West.  
It is evident that to the United States the FTA with Morocco does not only result in 
economic advantages but that broader political stakes are also involved.  In fact, some scholars 
argue that the economic benefits would be of less significance considering the size of the U.S. 
economy and the level of trade between the two countries; and that the real attraction of the FTA 
is its usefulness as a foreign policy tool.
40
   This paradigm will be addressed in chapter 3 where 
the effects of the FTA on Morocco’s democratization will be analyzed.   
 
The Major Non-NATO Ally 
While the FTA has bound the United States and Morocco economically, and to some 
degree politically, the bilateral ties between the two countries have been particularly 
strengthened in the area of security and military.  The Bush Administration designated Morocco 
as a major non-NATO ally of the United States, a position unique to Morocco in the extended 
Maghreb and Sahel region.  In this capacity Morocco participates in NATO’s Operation Active 
Endeavor which is a joint operation in the Mediterranean Sea, monitoring for terrorists.  The 
U.S. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSPCTP) is another joint security initiative that 
Morocco takes part in.  In addition, Morocco is also regularly engaged in bilateral military 
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exercises with the United States.  The FBI and CIA have provided assistance to Moroccan 
security forces in the investigation of the Casablanca bombings, and the agencies’ directors have 
visited Rabat to provide consultations to Moroccan counterparts.  The non-NATO ally status also 
makes Morocco eligible for additional military and security aids.  For instance, the United States 
has increased military assistance resulting in a Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grant of up to 
$2.4 billion to Morocco, which was announced by the Defense Department in December 2007, 
scheduled to be delivered during the period 2011 through 2015.  In the following section, U.S. 
aid to Morocco at large will be discussed.    
 
U.S. Aid to Morocco 
In any discourse on countries that receive U.S. aid, the foremost names that emerge are 
Israel, and Egypt, followed by Jordan.  At least two of these countries no doubt eclipse the other 
aid recipients in the MENA as well as the world.  A sizable part of their aid could be arguably 
attributable to their direct involvement and proximity to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  It is in 
the next tier of countries receiving U.S. aid where Morocco ranks at the top.  An increase in 
foreign aid in the aftermath of 9/11 was briefly discussed in previous sections, but it should be 
noted that Morocco has long been a grantee of a significant share of American aid.   
Since the time of its decolonization in 1956, Morocco has been the single biggest 
recipient of American financial assistance, among all Arab states except Egypt.  Between the 
time of decolonization of Western Sahara by Spain in 1975 and the turn of the twenty-first 
century, more than one-fifth of the total American aid to Africa was allotted to Morocco.  Of 
this, military aid alone accounted for more than US$1 billion.  More recently, following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, U.S. aid allocated to the North African ally took a steep climb.  In 2002 for 
16 
instance, nearly 75% of the total American assistance to the three Maghreb states was granted to 
Morocco.  This percentage once again rose in 2005 to 81.8, or nearly US$58 million.  After 
2005, the military aid alone has been hiked up to US$20 million in order to enable Morocco to 
continue its cooperation with the United States in combatting terrorism, as well as protecting its 
own borders from transnational terrorism.
41
  In 2007, the Defense Department announced a grant 
for the sale of military aircrafts, equipment, and services.  In addition, after the U.S.-Morocco 
FTA took effect in 2006, the United States has increased the aid to further assist its ally toward 
economic progress, fighting poverty, and democratization.  To this effect, a five-year grant to 
Morocco in the amount of US$697.5 million was approved by the Millenium Challenge 
Corporation Board in August 2007.
42
  This is consistent with a previously made promise by the 
head of the USTR Robert Zoellick that the United States plans to provide ongoing development 
assistance and trade-related technical assistance to enable Morocco to fulfill the terms and 
commitments that are a part of the FTA.
43
 
 
Conclusion 
In order to analyze the effects of U.S. foreign policy on democratization in Morocco, it is 
essential to first understand the theoretical foundations that explain the superpower’s policies in 
the overall MENA region.  Brumberg’s distinction between political liberalization and 
democratization, along with Perry’s dichotomous view of Washington’s rhetoric versus the 
reality regarding democracy promotion, serve as analytical tools for this case study of Morocco.   
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Next, an overview of the evolution of relations and interests between the United States 
and Morocco is rather telling of the importance of the latter’s stability to the superpower.  While 
Egypt and Jordan have served as key Arab allies in the Middle East, in the Maghreb, it is 
Morocco that occupies this unique position vis-à-vis the United States.  It is noteworthy that 
since the end of the Cold War as well as the crisis in Algeria, the United States has also 
improved relations and developed significant security cooperation with this neighbor of 
Morocco.  However, due to its long history of persistent pro-American leanings, Morocco has 
not only maintained its special relationship with the United States, but has also now become a 
major non-NATO ally.   
As a result of Morocco’s unique strategic value to the United States, the two countries 
have entered into an FTA.  These developments have qualified Morocco for increased assistance 
from the United States on the economic front.  In addition, Morocco has served as an important 
ally in the American war against terrorism.  As a result, the North African kingdom enjoys 
substantial increases in military and security assistance from the United States.  This alliance has 
also led to a tempered U.S. policy regarding the conflict in Western Sahara, one that is not 
unfavorable to Morocco.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN MOROCCO 
 
Introduction 
With reference to democratization in Morocco, U.S. officials often evoke two main ideas 
that motivate the superpower’s promotion efforts.44  First, by facilitating the prosperity and peace 
that would result from democratization in this accessible state at the crossroads of the MENA 
and Europe, the United States might win the goodwill of populations in the Arab core.  This 
might lead to a desirable ripple effect of other states in the region welcoming U.S. policies that 
call for political and especially economic reforms.  Second is the realization that the security of 
the West is very much tied to the stability and peace in the MENA, which democracy is thought 
to bring. With respect to Morocco, NATO has repeatedly informed the United States that 
Western Europe cannot realize full security as long as there is discontent among the population 
of its southern neighbor.   Similar concerns were expressed in the United States in the 1990’s by 
various high-ranking officials including former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
45
  
Democracy promotion became a core principle of U.S. foreign policy during the term of 
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President Clinton.  However, it is the jolt of the September 11
th
 attacks that brought the issue to 
the forefront as highly urgent and critical to U.S. and Western security, making it a top rhetoric 
in U.S-MENA relations.  Although this rhetoric on democratization is filled with conflicts of 
interests for the United States, Morocco has emerged as one of the high-priority targets of this 
U.S. policy.   In this chapter, I explore in detail the extent of the U.S. effort, the approach, and 
the specific sectors in Morocco that are targeted for this purpose.   
 
Methods of Democracy Promotion 
Before delving into the facts and figures pertaining to U.S. policy on Morocco, there 
needs to be an understanding of what is meant by democracy promotion as it comes in a variety 
of forms.  It could entail a number of direct or indirect measures to induce reforms in the targeted 
country.  Coercive measures like military action, the metaphorical carrot and stick method, 
democracy assistance such as aid, and economic or political incentives, are examples of direct 
means.  Indirect means include economic policies that are accompanied by conditionality 
binding the recipient in an implicit compact, and economic or social policies that affect the 
bottom layers of society that in turn would exert upward pressure for democratization.  With 
respect to Morocco, the U.S. policy is a combination of measures such as democracy assistance, 
incentives, social and economic policies including those with some conditionality.  Therefore, 
democracy promotion is defined here as all assistance that is intended to effect in democratic 
reforms in state institutions, as well as aid and policies that are intended to indirectly facilitate 
democratic progression.   
At the state level in Morocco, the United States pursues a course of bilateral diplomacy 
where U.S. officials engage and support the Moroccan government in reform initiatives.  These 
20 
include improvements to parliamentary processes, the electoral system, and to some degree, the 
judicial system.   Apart from these direct measures, there are U.S.-led programs involving the 
Moroccan government to address economic issues that elevate the unemployment level, poverty, 
and consequently the vulnerability of some pockets of society to radicalization out of 
hopelessness.   Other initiatives have engaged Moroccan political parties to improve their 
structural and functional aspects.  In addition to the institutional level, U.S. programs have been 
heavily involved in building a strong civil society by empowering various segments of Moroccan 
society.  It is believed in Washington that strengthening the social platform and nurturing the 
society’s associational capabilities are key necessities for improving local governance and the 
political progress of a nation.  In the following sections, I examine the magnitude and extent of 
the U.S. democracy promotion strategy in Morocco, which encompasses programs targeting 
society and state at various levels.  Whether or not this strategy is really aimed at bringing a full-
fledge democracy in Morocco is a question that will be answered based on the analysis in the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
 
The Promoters & the Targets 
What is certain is that U.S. assistance goes toward a multitude of elements in Morocco’s 
social, political and economic spheres to facilitate reforms and liberalization.  The funding for 
this is channeled through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), and the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor (DRL.)  The MEPI funds target political parties, the judicial sector, 
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grassroots and local organizations, women’s training, and entrepreneurship programs.46  
USAID’s democracy and governance funds have been invested in decentralization of power, 
support for local government, reforms in the Moroccan Parliament, and national budget planning 
systems.  In addition, USAID has heavily focused on creating programs to uplift citizens and 
prime them for integration into the political and economic systems of Morocco.   Some 
assistance projects however cannot be strictly classified as belonging to MEPI or USAID, 
because efforts might be merged.  Moreover, USAID provides an institutional umbrella in 
Morocco, and most MEPI projects are administered by the organization.  This does not however 
take away from MEPI’s own set of priorities and goals according to which projects are designed.    
 
Strengthening the Social Platform 
The U.S. assistance program in Morocco places a special emphasis on the demand-side of 
the equation, or what officials in the Bush administration have described as a bottom-up 
approach to promoting democracy.  In other words, in addition to state level reforms, the policy 
is also concerned with improving social components that would become an integral part of a 
more pluralistic political system.   For this purpose, issues such as access to education, women’s 
status, poverty, unemployment, and at-risk underprivileged youth are addressed.  U.S. 
policymakers purport that tackling these issues is the first step toward building a strong civil 
society that can either make or break a democratic system.  Reports published by the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) frequently reiterate the belief that democratic units 
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cannot thrive at the local or national level if the subjects within them are too ill-equipped to 
uphold it.   
The notion of a strong civil society being crucial for establishing democracy has been 
prevalent among scholars as well as policymakers, although the extent of its importance has been 
highly debated among the latter.  Augustus Richard Norton for example has stated that the 
development of a strong civil society is a vital step to build a freer Middle East.  Without it, the 
chances of sustainable democracy are much lower.
47
  Even scholars like Vickie Langohr and 
Thomas Carothers who have been more critical of its value have agreed that a vibrant civil 
society that is geared toward the right causes is a building block of pluralism.
48,49
  Both 
Carothers and Langohr have however identified that too much focus on this social component 
may be futile because it is not sufficient in itself to bring democracy to a country.   U.S. 
policymakers have seemed much more convinced of the returns of civil society than political 
scientists.  In a 2010 address in Krakow, Poland, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed that 
focusing on civil society is a core value of the U.S. democracy promotion strategy.  She added 
that throughout history, non-governmental organizations and associations have been the 
instrumental in upholding as well as improving democracy in the United States.
50
  This ideology 
is strongly reflected in U.S. efforts in Morocco which include a plethora of programs targeting 
the Moroccan society. 
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Integration of the Disenfranchised 
One of the key issues in Morocco that might obstruct democratic progress is the 
population distribution.  Nearly a half of all resident Moroccans are within thirty years of age.
51
  
Yet this population is mostly isolated from the political processes of the country. This statistic 
becomes particularly problematic and challenging in the poor sectors of society.  Lack of access 
to formal education deprives these citizens of the opportunities to participate in the local political 
process or influence decision making.  The U.S. government has partnered with the government 
of Morocco to design programs to address the marginalization of these youth.  Within the last 
decade, the number of underprivileged youth has been on the rise, especially young males who 
are crossing over from marginalization to disaffection.  Having no meaningful place in public or 
civil society institutions and no hope in the current political system, they have become a pool of 
easy recruits for radical Islamist groups.  The two cases of terrorist attacks in the Casablanca 
region in 2003 and 2007 attest to this, as the bombings were carried out by youth from this 
sector.  To help the Moroccan government uplift this disaffected group and positively engage 
them in society, USAID provides assistance to the Ministry of Education.  From this assistance, 
three programs emerged between 2004 and 2008 that provide improved education.
52
  The largest 
share from the U.S. funding for education is allocated for restructuring high school programs to 
suit the demands of the market place.  These include employable skills targeted toward particular 
industries such as agricultural business, tourism, and other vocational sectors.   In 2005, more 
than $7 million was invested in selecting target schools, consulting with business sectors, 
creating programs to match business needs, and providing teacher training.  In addition, the same 
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year, a similar amount was invested in basic education improvement.  According to the updated 
education assistance strategy of 2009, USAID has increased funds to target youth who do not 
have the means for formal education, as well as to enhance the education of youth who are 
already enrolled.   
As a complementary initiative by the U.S. government, the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) works to combat unemployment and poverty in Morocco. The five-year 
compact with Morocco (the first and only MENA country to have qualified for MCC other than 
Jordan) was signed in 2007, for nearly $700 million.  Much of this aid is committed for programs 
alleviating unemployment and poverty, and to uplift disenfranchised rural communities. As a 
measure against unemployment, the Enterprise Support Project facilitates the Moroccan 
government’s training initiatives encouraging a greater entrepreneurial culture, especially among 
young university graduates. Nearly $25 million out of a projected $33.8 million is committed 
toward this project which includes measuring the actual impact made by the initiative, and 
helping the government to better manage this program.
53
   
The fundamental goal of the U.S. government in such social projects is to harness the 
Moroccan society’s involvement in the political activity of the country.  For this, USAID has 
guided the Moroccan Civic Education Center in implementing special education programs on the 
principles of democracy.  Students are taught to identify problems or needs in their local 
community, research existing policies, examine solution options, construct proposals for policy 
action, and present and negotiate with their local authorities. In addition, training is also provided 
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to local educators in order to expand the eventual outreach of this program.  Between 2004 and 
2008, several hundred secondary schools across Morocco were included in this initiative.
54
   
 
Integration of Women 
In 2003 the Moroccan government made progressive reforms to the Family Code laws 
called the Moudawana, particularly in areas that affect women’s rights.  However, its 
implementation continues to suffer due to local judges who are under-trained in these new laws, 
compounded by rural women’s lack of knowledge on the matter mainly due to illiteracy.  
USAID, partnered with Morocco’s State Secretariat for Literacy and Non-formal Education, 
introduced an innovative “bridge” program to educate women.55  This includes reading, writing, 
and basic Arabic which is different from Morocco’s native tongues (Derija and Tamazight).  The 
program is aimed to enable women to read and comprehend basic legal rights, which are 
documented in Arabic and French.  Therefore it includes instruction of the new Family Code 
educating them on their legal socioeconomic rights especially concerning marriage and divorce.  
As of 2009, this program has experienced over 90% retention rates (out of 400 women) in a pilot 
group spanning sixteen provinces.  This again is in line with the U.S. policy to better equip the 
currently disenfranchised segments of Moroccan society for participation in democratic 
processes.  
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 Involving the Civil Society 
U.S. agencies work extensively with the Moroccan civil society, in order to promote its 
input and influence in decision making at the local and national levels.  One prominent area has 
been USAID’s Parliamentary Support Project that has created avenues for citizens to engage in 
the political process.   In 2007, the team organized debates over the Internet on democracy 
issues, hosted by TANMIA—Morocco’s premier Civil Society Organizations online network.56  
This event was timed to coincide with the parliamentary debates taking place on similar issues.  
Among the reforms addressed in these debates, were the ratification of the International 
Convention Against Corruption and increasing public access to governmental data and 
information.  The other main area of focus was decentralization, calling for more executive 
powers to be devolved to locally elected officials.  This USAID project enabled TANMIA to 
post on the Internet, important Moroccan legal resources including the Constitution, and the 
internal rules for both parliamentary houses.  This online resource was tapped into by several 
thousands of users within the first three months.
57
   
As a consequence of the USAID-TANMIA initiative, sixty seven civil society 
organizations formed coalitions to negotiate with the parliament on a wide variety of issues 
including access to governmental information and an open budget.  Subsequently, the USAID-
Morocco Parliamentary Support Project organized a conference along with the national Budget 
Analysis Office, on the parliamentary oversight of the national budget.  This was an initiative for 
an inclusive approach that would engage citizens in the discussion of the national budget cycle.  
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It encompassed Moroccan civil society organizations along with selected budget experts, and 
representatives from various factions of the national as well as local governments.   
According to the Morocco Country Assistance Strategy of 2009, the U.S. government has 
further increased its emphasis on strengthening the country’s civil society.  It is a five-year 
strategy that is geared toward increasing pluralism in the government’s functioning.  There are 
projects to expand the scope and capacity of civil society to advocate more effectively with the 
government, and ultimately influence policy making.  This expanded outreach provides linkage 
with reforms initiated in the judicial sector during this period.  American agencies have guided 
the participation of civil society in these legal reforms, by way of providing legal analysis, 
technical support, advocacy for citizen concerns, and in calling for increased accountability of 
the branch.  
It is evident from the 2009-2013 U.S. democracy assistance strategy for Morocco that 
policymakers continue to follow the Bush administration’s bottom-up approach.  Scholars have 
rightly observed that there is a tendency among U.S. democracy promotion programs to focus 
heavily on people, rather than placing all the eggs in the institutional basket.
58
  That said, 
programs targeting political parties, governmental institutions, and the Makhzen are equally if 
not more important data for the current analysis, because ultimately these are the entities directly 
making political reform.   
 
Political Parties 
Somewhere between the people and their civil societies on the one side, and the state 
institutions on the other, lie political parties.  In theory, they form an interface through which 
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citizens would make their needs heard, which in turn would translate these needs to the policy 
making arena and influence decisions.  But in actuality, this process is not nearly as feasible or 
clear-cut in states that are newly transforming into democracies or only partially as in Morocco’s 
case.
59
  One of the main reasons for this is the lack of strong party structures and inefficient or 
even negative organizational tendencies.  For example, parties in Morocco for the most part have 
been internally elitist with power concentrated among a few.  Non-transparent and non-
diversified sources of party funding are another weakness.  In addition, most of Morocco’s more 
than thirty parties lack a clear and a consistent policy-profile which prevents them from building 
a solid membership base.  As a result, historically speaking, parties in Morocco have not 
provided the linkage between citizens and the state, as should be their primary role.  From the 
experience of Western countries, organized parties well-rooted in society have been essential in 
the evolution and functioning of democracies.  With this reasoning, U.S. promotion of 
democracy in Morocco includes what appears to be impressive assistance to political parties.  
The scale of activities for party assistance in Morocco clearly indicates its importance among 
donors.
60
 
There are two main quasi-governmental U.S. organizations that carry out the 
implementation of party assistance programs—the National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI).  Their main goals are 
strengthening internal structures of individual parties, improving their capacity to develop policy 
positions that are politically viable, and establishing stronger interactive channels with voters.  In 
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addition the two organizations also work to strengthen the overall party system as a collective 
political entity.  Following is a detailed analysis of U.S. led activities in this realm.   
 
The Islamist Dilemma 
The American providers of party-assistance in Morocco have typically invited the six 
largest parties, ranging across the entire ideological spectrum, to participate in their activities.  
The activities have directly corresponded to the three broad goals listed above.  However, while 
selecting the parties to work with, U.S. policymakers have experienced a fundamental 
dilemma—to include or to exclude Islamist parties.   
There are two main Islamist organizations in Morocco, one of them a political party and 
the other designated as a charity organization.  The Justice and Development Party (known by its 
French acronym PJD) is a non-revolutionary Islamist party that rose to prominence by gaining 
seats in the 1997 parliamentary elections and subsequently in 2002.  In conformance with the 
traditional Moroccan view of the King as the “Commander of the Faithful”,61 the party does not 
challenge the regime’s authority as such.  The other group, known as Justice and Charity (JCO) 
is only recognized as a charity organization in spite of its very loud discourse on Moroccan 
politics.  One seemingly obvious reason for its not obtaining “party” status is its rejection of the 
monarchy’s legitimacy.  However, this reason is perhaps only a corollary to the main cause of its 
exclusion—its own refusal to participate in Moroccan politics due to its view that the entire 
political system is corrupt.
62
  For this section of the current study, it is therefore the PJD that is 
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more relevant, because it is an official political party, hence a subject of debate in the party-
assistance strategy of U.S. democracy promotion. 
Returning to the dilemma faced in Washington, the PJD has suffered from a trust deficit 
among U.S. policymakers simply because of its being an Islamist group.  This is likely rooted in 
the fundamental Western view of non-secularism as counter-democratic.  According to the 
congressional research body, there have been contradicting projections of the PJD’s true 
character.  Some have posited that due to its religious self-identification, it is bound to work 
toward turning Morocco into an Islamic state, where Sharia or Islamic Law would be the primary 
basis for legislation.  They fear that U.S. involvement with this party might empower it and 
might lead to an outcome like the 2006 Palestinian Authority election, which was won by 
Hamas.  Others have interpreted PJD’s principles as being deliberately more centrist because its 
leaders generally try to strike a balance between opposition to the government on some issues 
and willingness to work with the state on most other issues.  The party’s most vocal criticisms of 
the government however, have been on the grounds of corruption and nepotism which are 
evidently secular concerns.   
One comforting signal to U.S. policymakers has been the evolution of PJD’s stance 
regarding the reforms made to the Moroccan Family Code, the Moudawana.  There was initially 
wide opposition from within the Islamist pockets of Morocco, viewing the reforms as a sign of 
Western imperial influence.  This opposition was eventually overcome by the king in 2004 when 
he pushed through the new laws.  Although the monarch claimed to operate within the confines 
of Islamic law, these reforms were a major deviation from the mainstream interpretations of 
Sharia elsewhere in the broader MENA.  But this event was not nearly as groundbreaking as 
PJD’s acceptance of this revision which ordained women with rights that would be unimaginable 
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to Islamist organizations across the world.
63
  Reflecting on this progressive position in 2005, the 
party’s spokespeople have commented that, because the PJD is committed to Islamic as well as 
democratic principles it accepts this revision to the family code, as it was democratically enacted.  
To re-iterate the party’s commitment to democracy Vice-Secretary Abdelah Baha even went so 
far as to liken the party to the American evangelicals, stating that PJD’s Islam and democracy 
can go together just as Christianity and democracy.   
It is not only U.S. policymakers who have faced a dilemma regarding the party-assistance 
strategy.  The party too seems to have undergone much internal contemplation over what exactly 
it stands for and how it should receive U.S. policy in Morocco.  On the outset, the party was 
formed by a conglomeration of several Islamist groups which has made its membership diverse 
across the ideological spectrum.  As a result, the party has had to maintain a careful balancing act 
so as to maintain its appeal to both ends of this spectrum.  The significance here to U.S. 
policymakers is that, as they have pondered over this Islamist question this party has displayed 
mixed signals.  Just when reports in Congress were cautioning against PJD’s possible 
fundamentalist agenda, the party took stances hinting that it is after all a political player that is 
pragmatic and prone to adapting to the demands of politics as any secular party.  In the early 
2000’s the PJD rejected meeting any officials who were connected to Washington.  However, by 
2005 this position had evolved into a willingness to work with U.S. representatives, although still 
maintaining its rhetoric of opposition to the invasion of Iraq.   
While PJD is an official political party, it also has affiliations with organizations that 
make up its religious wing.  However, what is also comforting to the United States is that the 
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party maintains an agreeable degree of separation of its politics from its religious body.  It also 
holds that there is no need for further Islamization of the state or society as Morocco is already a 
Muslim country.  What the PJD insists on however, is defending the Islamic identity and not 
crossing that line in legislation.  Exactly what this means for the long run is quite unclear.  
Nonetheless, U.S. policymakers have been welcoming of the party’s centrist positions, which to 
the West appears far more moderate compared to Islamist movements in other countries.   
Perhaps the most significant factor to the United States is that the PJD does not call into 
question the political foundations of the kingdom.  Unlike the JCO, the party does not seek to 
dismantle the monarchy, neither in its policies nor rhetoric.  As a result, in spite of its being the 
opposition party, the palace has officially allowed the party to grow and stay active in the 
political system.  The palace’s decision was also calculated by the fact that some 45% of 
Morocco’s constituency supports the PJD, which indicates that suppressing it might be suicidal 
like the Algerian experience in the previous decade.  On the other hand, legitimizing and 
institutionalizing the party would convert it into “state Islam”, a trick that was proven successful 
by King Hassan II.
64
  To the U.S. policymakers, this relationship between the palace and the PJD 
boosts their confidence in the king’s capacity to keep the party in check.  This, enhanced by the 
party’s own pragmatic moves, and its change of stance vis-à-vis U.S. democracy promoters, has 
served as a tipping point in Washington’s dilemma.  Beginning mid-2000’s, the United States 
has pursued an inclusivist policy with the PJD.   
In March and May 2006, both the PJD and the U.S. State Department’s International 
Visitor’s Program sponsored mutual visits to expand dialogue and coordinate democracy 
promotion efforts in the future.  While the United States is careful in not over-emphasizing its 
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involvement with the PJD, there have been several U.S. sponsored programs in which the party 
has been an active participant.  Within the year 2006, the relationship between the two entities 
became “fairly good” according to scholars.65  The party’s members who are seemingly 
ambitious have taken full advantage of the training opportunities and technical support offered to 
them by the NDI and the IRI programs.  The party has occasionally boycotted events directly 
sponsored by the U.S. government, and continues to voice its opposition to U.S. policy in Iraq.  
But such rhetoric does not constitute to its exclusion by U.S. organizations.  Moreover, including 
the PJD also helps the United States contradict its image of being categorically opposed to 
Islamic groups.    
 
The Secular Parties 
Among the numerous secular parties, there have been two prominent ones over the last 
few decades—the Istiqlal party and the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP).  
Although these two groups have been important players in Moroccan politics with considerable 
following since the country’s independence, they have become passive and have lacked a clear 
initiative in the recent years.  Like the other secular parties in Morocco, they are highly 
fragmented.  The vigor and the drive with which the PJD has operated over the last decade are 
not visible in these parties.  This is not to say that the two main parties have lost their mass 
appeal, but they have lacked the leadership to take effective strides and increase their following.  
On the other hand, the Islamists do exactly that and have been increasingly successful.  Many 
U.S. government officials have insisted that secular parties should be strengthened and propped 
up as non-Islamist democratic alternatives to Moroccans.  It should be noted however that the 
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secular parties of Morocco are not militant secularists who demand the removal of every hint of 
religion from the public space as seen in France’s model.  They do recognize the overarching 
Islamic nature of the country and the king’s role as its spiritual head.   Nonetheless due to their 
otherwise secular political ideology and no strong radically inspired anti-U.S. positions, one 
could argue that U.S. party assistance is by default aimed at these groups, and that the PJD is just 
a by-product recipient.  In fact, including the PJD has resulted in some backlashes from the other 
parties who fear the strengthening of an Islamist group in Morocco.   
 
U.S. Support for Parties 
One of the main areas of focus in U.S. party assistance has been the development of 
policy positions.  In the past in Moroccan parliamentary elections, it was often individuals who 
contested for elections with less emphasis on the parties that they belonged to.  As a result, the 
party base has remained weak and somewhat fluid.  It has not been uncommon for a candidate to 
switch parties between one election and the next.  The parties’ policy profiles too have suffered 
due to the lack of strong affiliations between the parties and the leading individuals.  Such an 
environment also leaves room for policy-hopping both at the individual member level and at the 
party level.  As a result most parties have lacked the ability to harness and more importantly 
maintain loyal support in the constituency.  In addition, low voter-turnouts in elections have 
proven that there is a lack of confidence or faith in the parties and their political stances.  To 
address these issues, USAID has commissioned NDI and IRI to hold training programs to 
improve the capacity of parties to develop thorough and feasible policy stances, and then reach 
out to the voters in a more effective manner.  Interestingly, the one party that has been relatively 
free of the problems mentioned here is the PJD, which has maintained a much more coherent 
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policy portfolio and an active communication channel with voters.  Its leaders have nevertheless 
availed the opportunities for further development offered by U.S. led programs and other 
international efforts. 
Among the U.S. NGO’s involved, the NDI and IRI are the primary actors in this area.  
Their activities are part of a broader international effort of which the United Nations 
Development Program is a key representative.  Together these organizations have implemented 
the following measures to improve individual parties as well as the party system as a whole: 
 Regulating the individual party’s internal structure and establishing democratic 
decision-making practices such as leadership selection 
 Regulating the party’s finance, assuring transparency and diversification of party 
funding 
 Professionalizing party office-holders to increase law-making competence 
 Training party leaders to build stronger linkages with the constituency 
 Encouraging increased inter-organizational ties such as with unions 
 Supporting professional recruitment for membership 
 Facilitating dialogues with other parties to provide inter-organizational learning 
 Improving a party’s media communication to better inform citizens of its policies 
 Implementing grassroots initiatives to engage typically marginalized groups such as 
youth, women, and the poor 
While there is an ongoing effort to support the improvements mentioned above, the peak 
of U.S. attention to political parties seems to occur during the period leading up to elections.  
Preceding the 2007 elections, the NDI organized a conference entitled “Manage to Win:  
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Planning and Organizing a National Election Campaign.”66  The special focus of the forum was 
developing a detailed organizational strategy, a clear message, and a centralized national 
campaign.  Training was provided for creating a national campaign management team that would 
design, coordinate and implement all the electoral activities of the parties.   
During election years, U.S. agencies have also held several one-on-one meetings series 
with four of the most prominent (secular) parties.  Strangely, the Istiqlal has not been listed as 
one of them, although it ended up securing maximum seats in the 2007 elections surpassing the 
projected winner—PJD.  Regardless, according to a USAID Democracy and Governance report, 
much has been done to reinforce parties’ organizational components and structures, with an 
emphasis on a strong national electoral campaign.
67
  The report also informs that, resulting from 
these U.S. led efforts the four parties have adopted the use of national campaign management 
teams to run their campaigns.  Consequently they have developed improved and more structured 
messages to deliver to citizens.   The only party that has been described as already having such 
structures in place is again the PJD, which went on to win the 2011 elections
68
 with a wide 
margin over the 2007 winner, the Istiqlal.   
The U.S. policy regarding political parties extends to the local levels as well.  The IRI has 
employed similar party-assistance measures at the regional and local levels as at the national 
levels.  The primary goals identified at the top such as strengthening party structures and 
improving internal democracy and communication are applied also in the local context.  To 
summarize, the data makes it evident that the health of the party system is given much 
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importance, at least in the Moroccan case.  It has been observed by scholars that Morocco seems 
to be a highly favored target for U.S. party-assistance.
69
 
 
Targeting the State 
Apart from efforts to strengthen the non-state actors such as civil society and political 
parties, U.S. democracy promotion also encompasses the state, up to a certain level.  The main 
institutions or functions of the state to be touched are the Parliament, elections, and the judicial 
branch.  USAID and other bodies have encouraged and supported reforms in these legs of the 
state, although with caution so as to not disturb the Makhzen too much.  
 
Elections 
The Unite States agencies have provided assistance to improve what they regard as the 
hallmark of democracies—the election process.  One of the high profile activities has been 
opinion polling undertaken by the IRI prior to past parliamentary elections.  In addition the NDI 
too has conducted a large number of focus groups as part of a particular opinion polling 
technique, to gauge the Moroccan public’s inclinations.70  USAID’s Parliamentary Support 
Project facilitated pre-election online debates in 2007 bringing in the media community into the 
platform.  One of the focal points in this project was the anti-corruption forum.  As a result of the 
discussions in this forum the media vocalized its call for candidates to be required to declare 
their property and financial assets prior to running for Parliamentary elections.  The same was 
demanded of candidates in local elections.   
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The NDI has also headed a large team for an international election observation mission to 
Morocco.  During the 2007 Parliamentary election this team along with an election assessment 
team, were delegated to ensure the quality, efficiency, transparency and professionalism of the 
process.  The fifty members of this delegation were comprised of legislators, former government 
ministers, ambassadors, as well as region specialists and experts in elections.  Moroccan polling 
stations were visited and observed by the delegates.  Resulting in part from this effort, these 
elections were found by the teams to have been the most transparent and fair elections in the 
history of Morocco, as of 2007.  The main drawback identified was the low voter turnout, and 
recommendations were made to improve it.  The NDI has actively worked with Moroccan civil 
society organizations to push for higher voter participation, which incidentally did occur in the 
2011 parliamentary elections though it was a modest improvement.
71
   
In addition to the national level, the U.S. government has also focused on improving 
regional and municipal elections.  As part of its policy of promoting reform among the inner 
layers of society, U.S. assistance is directed toward increasing the transparency, accountability, 
and performance of local representational bodies.  As per the 2009-2013 Morocco Country 
Assistance Strategy, USAID has increased its efforts to engage the public in local elections and 
decision-making.   
 
Parliament 
U.S. involvement with the Moroccan Parliament has been driven by three primary 
concerns.   First, the assisting organizations work to improve the fairness of the system.  That is 
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to say, ensuring there is transparency, lack of corruption, and true representation of the people.  
Secondly, U.S. agencies support the parliament in enacting the kind of legislation that delivers 
the promised benefits to the constituencies.  Thirdly, the U.S. government promotes reforms that 
would enhance the role of the parliament in the state’s functioning.  The emphasis seems to be on 
addressing the public’s grievances and nurturing a more inclusive legislative environment that 
does not ignore people’s needs.   
Between October 2004 and June 2008, the Center for International Development, an 
entity belonging to the State University of New York implemented a project to improve the 
capabilities of the Moroccan Parliament.  This was a three-year program that provided technical 
assistance and training.  The project was designed to specifically strengthen three function areas 
of the Parliament:  1) its capacity to oversee public finances; 2) reviewing legislation and policy; 
and 3) engaging in dialogue with citizens and fostering increased public participation in 
parliamentary decision-making processes.
72
 
 In 2008, USAID’s Morocco Parliament Support Project partnered with the Parliament’s 
Budget Analysis Office (BAB) to organize a large scale conference on parliamentary oversight 
of the national budget involving a multitude of entities.  It consisted of key representatives of 
diverse levels of the Moroccan government, selected budget experts, the Arab Parliamentary 
Union,
73
 and Moroccan civil society organizations.  One of the key goals to have emerged from 
this initiative is to pursue substantial reforms in the national government that would expand the 
role of the parliament in the national budget cycle.  This would extend to the total evaluation of 
the annual budget before it is officially adopted by the government.  The BAB itself serves as an 
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interface between the members of parliament and the executive branch.  In this conference, the 
upper house announced that the total budget for BAB would be doubled for the fiscal year 2009.  
All in all, this initiative was a multi-pronged effort to furbish a more inclusive approach in the 
national budget process, where the parliament plays a bigger role and the citizens are also 
engaged in the discussions.   
In a measure to increase the transparency of the government, USAID has provided 
technical support and equipment that puts the parliament “on the record.”74  According to the 
agency’s Democracy and Governance branch, the details of parliamentary discussions are critical 
data that should be easily available to journalists, civil society, citizens, as well as members of 
parliament, so that these groups can be involved in policy debates and influence decision 
making.  However as of 2006, the Moroccan legislature had fallen three years behind in 
publishing this information.  This was due to outdated and labor-intensive transcription methods 
as well as cumbersome internal regulations that slowed the process even more.  USAID’s 
Parliament Support Project has since resolved this problem by providing technical and human 
resources to get caught-up on the backlog.  But more importantly, the U.S. agency has provided 
the Moroccan parliament with new technology that transcribes the parliamentary sessions in real 
time.  As a result, the process has become more transparent, giving citizens timely access to the 
debates, thus fostering a more democratic culture.   
 
Local Governance 
Democracy promotion activities at the local government level are carried out by 
USAID’s Morocco Local Government Project (LGP).  Between 2005 and 2008, the agency 
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contracted the Research Triangle Institute (RTI)
75
 to implement a three-year program of 
technical assistance and training in order to improve the democratic functions of several regional 
and local governmental bodies.  Among those included in the program, were the Ministry of 
Interior, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, and the governments of seven provinces 
and twenty-six communes.
76
  In addition, in the field itself, the LGP maintains close working 
relations with the elected officials of more than ten partner cities across three major regions.  It 
works to increasingly connect the citizens and these officials in the decision-making process.
77
  
In addition, USAID has supported the Casablanca city council to initiate a series of forums 
involving public, civil society, and elected officials to discuss local governance issues in this 
largest and most populous city of Morocco.   
 
Judicial Assistance  
On the Moroccan judicial front, the U.S. government provides assistance and technical 
training through several channels.  The Department of State, the MEPI, and USAID are among 
the bigger players in this area, while there have been other smaller organizations backed by the 
United States that have also carried out reform initiatives.   
One high-priority reform area has been the laws concerning corruption at various levels 
of the criminal justice system.
78
  U.S. support has mobilized legal associations that have been 
engaged in a constructive dialogue with the Moroccan government, pushing for necessary 
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judicial reforms. Purportedly because of this effort, the government has developed a national 
anticorruption strategy—a set of revised legal procedures.  In addition it has established a public 
awareness campaign and an anticorruption hotline. The U.S. government has also funded the 
creation of three pilot public anticorruption assistance centers in Morocco.
79
  
The U.S. Department of State and MEPI implemented a Legal and Judicial Development 
Program from 2005 to 2009 to assist the Moroccan Ministry of Justice (MOJ) with legal and 
judicial development such as the drafting of a judicial ethics charter which was adopted in March 
of 2009.
80
  Also in 2009, these U.S. entities funded and organized a training program for 
Moroccan judicial authorities on the reformed laws pertaining to women’s socioeconomic rights.  
In the past, undertrained judiciaries have been an obstacle in the proper application of these laws.   
Another program—initiated by the U.S. Embassy, implemented by USAID and the U.S. 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)—has focused on 
developing alternative sentencing or pre-trial diversion programs particularly aimed toward at-
risk youth who are apprehended for petty criminal behavior or non-violent criminal activity.  The 
reforms recommended here seek to provide positive engagement avenues for these youth.  The 
U.S. democracy promotion program tends to pay special attention to the marginalized youth 
population because they make up a significant percent of the Moroccan population. 
The U.S. government has promoted improvements to the court systems by providing 
judicial training to Moroccan officials.  There have been several issue-specific reform initiatives 
that have been recommended or supported at all judicial levels in Morocco.  But as a 
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comprehensive measure for judicial reform, the USAID/Morocco Mission has supported the 
development of a national reform strategy by the MOJ.  While the exact timeline for this project 
was unclear as of late 2010, USAID officials see a positive sign in the King’s recent 
pronouncements regarding this strategy.
81
   
 
Conclusion 
In its effort to promote democracy in the MENA, the United States has found Morocco to 
be the most accessible state.  While this policy was hardly prevalent in the previous decades, in 
the post-9/11 era, the U.S. government has invested extensively in promoting reforms in this 
North African ally. 
U.S. Democracy promotion efforts span over a broad spectrum of the Moroccan society.  
Scholars have observed, as is also evident from the facts and figures presented in this chapter 
that U.S. agencies tend to focus heavily on the demand-side, i.e., the citizens.  The foundation for 
this was laid by the Bush Administration’s bottom-up approach by which, U.S. agencies have 
sought to empower various pockets of the marginalized populations of Morocco.  This is 
considered by the policymakers to be a crucial step toward building strong civil societies which 
are an important component of a democratic political system.  For the same reason, U.S. donor 
organizations foster the involvement of civil societies in the local, regional, as well as national 
decision making processes. 
In addition to the people-side of the equation, U.S. democracy assistance is directed 
toward strengthening political parties and the party-system as a whole.  The Moroccan electoral 
processes are also targets of U.S. agencies.  Elections at the parliamentary level, as well as 
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regional levels have been monitored and supported by U.S. programs, at times in conjunction 
with international teams delegated for this purpose.   
Finally, U.S. agencies have invested heavily in improving the capabilities of the 
Moroccan state institutions.  Programs have been implemented to strengthen and expand the role 
of the parliament.  Similarly, assistance measures have also been directed toward reforms in the 
judicial branch.  In both these branches, increased transparency and accountability have been 
recommended and supported by U.S. agencies.   
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this chapter illustrates that the United States is 
extensively involved in Morocco, promoting improved governance and strengthening democratic 
processes in the country.  However, the information examined here does not indicate much U.S. 
activity targeting the democratization of the highest levels of governance.  In the next chapter, 
the relationship between the United States and the Moroccan monarchy will be discussed and 
analyzed.     
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REGIME 
 
Introduction 
Throughout the historical interplay between Morocco and the West, in every era the 
United States has had a stake in nurturing a stable and friendly Morocco.  For a number of 
decades it was Cold War politics that dictated U.S. interests and policies.  In the 1990’s it was 
Morocco’s physical proximity to the Algerian crisis that motivated U.S. policies.  In the current 
decade, the war on terrorism and the rise of militant Islamism throughout the Middle East and 
North Africa make it crucial for the United States to facilitate stability in Morocco.  As in 
previous decades, this necessitates that the existing regime—the primary pro-U.S. force in the 
country—remain intact and capable of countering potential threats to its survival.  In other words 
the “stability” sought by the United States has been that of the government.  Historically in 
MENA the U.S. method of ensuring this has been an almost unconditional support for friendly 
authoritarian regimes.  However, the lessons from terrorist attacks over the past decade, 
especially 9/11, have made the United States question this approach, as experts have said that 
wide-spread discontent in these countries due to the lack of democracy has produced terrorism as 
a way of rebellion.  While the United States has for this reason adopted the policy of promoting 
democratization as discussed in the previous chapter, the superpower nonetheless also provides 
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ample support for the maintenance of the regime.  The main avenues of support that have a 
strengthening effect on the monarchy are the trade agreement, security and military assistance, 
and the U.S. position regarding Western Sahara.    
 
The Three Main Platforms 
FTA:  Economic Support for the Regime 
The trade agreement between Rabat and Washington has prompted some interesting 
questions among scholars.  It would make more economic sense to spectators for Morocco to 
enter into an agreement with the EU because as trade theorists put the matter, Western Europe is 
after all Morocco’s “natural” trading partner.  During the planning years of the U.S.-Morocco 
agreement the EU accounted for approximately 60 percent of Morocco’s imports and about 75 
percent of its exports.  France alone accounted for one-fourth of the imports and one-third of the 
exports.  In contrast, the United States had been a relatively minor trading partner.  In the early 
2000’s it constituted only around 5 percent of Moroccan trade and the U.S. foreign investment 
too had been small.   Adding to the special nature of this FTA, there are areas where the United 
States has shown extra generosity or leniency toward Morocco.  For instance, it has looked the 
other way when it comes to child labor usage, which is expected to rise with the growth of the 
textile industry—an industry that receives considerable U.S. support as part of the FTA.  
According to The Economist, Morocco has long fallen short of meeting the standards established 
by UNICEF and International Labor Organization, regardless of which the country receives 
support from the U.S. for those very industries.
82
  Also, the Moroccan FTA has come with a 
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significant increase in aid from the United States, from $20 million in 2004 to $57 million in 
2005.  What is noteworthy here is that, even though this increase is not officially a part of the 
agreement, trade agreements in general have not come with such aid enhancements.  Gregory W. 
White points out that, when Mexico for example was harnessed into the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), there was no accompanying elevation of U.S. aid.  It should also be 
noted that Morocco had already been the recipient of the largest aid package from the United 
States in the Maghreb.   
Considering such unique factors surrounding the U.S.-Morocco FTA, one wonders what 
has motivated the superpower to enter into the agreement in the first place.  The answer is 
perhaps hidden in a statement made by President Bush, indicating that the agreement is a 
milestone in strengthening ties with this strong and moderate ally.  The “ally” referred to here is 
doubtless the king and the makhzen.  The FTA, when analyzed is a strengthening agent for the 
monarch and little benefit to the country’s overall economy.   
The analysis of Ahmed Galal and Robert Lawrence supports a part of this reasoning, by 
recognizing that the primary drivers of the trade agreement are in fact political factors.
83
  
Although these scholars agree that the realization of all the perceived political gains for the 
United States is subject to considerable uncertainty, they have identified a number of desirable 
effects generally projected by proponents of the FTA.  A quick examination of congressional 
research reports confirms this list.  First, Morocco’s reform process might be enhanced as a 
result of the agreement terms, and its governance and institutions improved.  These changes are 
believed to be stimulants of economic growth.  In addition, it is posited that prosperity resulting 
from a market system could improve political stability.  It is also argued by the proponents of the 
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FTA that such economic progress would facilitate the emergence of a full-fledged democracy.  
What exactly the connection is between the supposed economic progress and democratization 
remains to be explained at least in the case of Morocco, because the gains are likely to be reaped 
by only a niche of the population.  This point will become evident as the discussion proceeds.   
A third and more crucial objective to U.S. policymakers is to strengthen the superpower’s 
connection with Morocco by engaging in increased trade and foreign investment, ultimately 
leading to heightened cooperation.  This cooperation ranges from the security and counter-
terrorism arena to the Moroccan regime’s position vis-à-vis Israel.  It is after all the monarch’s 
willingness to cooperate in such matters that has made Morocco a pillar of U.S. interests in North 
Africa, and a top recipient of U.S. military aid.  The fourth expected outcome of a Moroccan 
FTA is that overall prosperity would reduce conditions of despair and discontent, the primary 
contributing factors for youth radicalization in Morocco.  What is baffling here is that studies do 
not particularly indicate that positive economic outcomes of the FTA will be so far reaching.   
While these effects are certainly in the interest of the United States, they are not 
necessarily assured, and are they contingent on a multitude of policies and training that would be 
required for facilitating such widespread economic progress.  In addition, as mentioned above, 
the trade between the United States and Morocco is so small that it may not even result in the 
kind of economic progress projected by policymakers.  It should also be pointed out that 
economic liberalization without the necessary preconditions could end up having an adverse 
effect on the overall welfare of the population.  On the other hand, such reforms help certain 
pockets of the population—the economic and political elite.   
This phenomenon has been highlighted by Joseph E. Stiglitz’s analysis of globalization 
and its lopsided effects.  Speaking of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) push for 
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liberalization in developing nations, Stiglitz has argued that forcing countries to open up to 
imported products that would compete with those produced locally in vulnerable industries could 
result in severe adverse effects—both economic and social.  Trade liberalization that occurs in 
the absence of established safety nets in fact exacerbates the unemployment problem, leading to 
increased poverty.  To summarize Stiglitz’s argument, economic liberalization such as that 
resulting from the FTA has very often failed to induce the promised growth and has contributed 
to further marginalization of the poor.
84
 Moreover, according to Stiglitz any economic growth 
caused by such reforms has been confined to the extremely wealthy, especially the top economic 
tier of society.  This in Morocco’s case is the royal family and its close-knit circle. Therefore in 
order to understand who exactly will enjoy this American induced “economic progress”, it is 
important to discuss the economic ambit of the king.    
Although the full extent of the king’s wealth and holdings is not accurately known, there 
is enough data revealing that Morocco’s economy is significantly controlled by the royal family, 
which owns most of the country’s main industries.  An example is the nation’s phosphate 
reserves, the nation’s primary natural resource.  Phosphate is a mineral that is vital to a broad 
array of industries across the world and hence in high demand in developed as well as newly 
industrializing countries.  With nearly 85 percent of the earth’s phosphate reserves under its soil, 
Morocco has come to be considered the Saudi Arabia of phosphates.
85
  Nearly three-quarters of 
these reserves are under the ownership of the royal family.  King Mohammed VI is the overseer 
of Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP), Morocco’s largest industrial company and also the 
state-owned monopoly of the nation’s phosphates.   In addition, he is also Morocco’s biggest 
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banker, land owner, farmer and grocer, and he controls the national markets for staples such as 
sugar, milk, and much more.  The king holds a controlling stake in the Groupe Omnium Nord 
Africain (ONA), a company that maintains near-monopolies on Moroccan sugar and steel.   
Morocco’s largest conglomerate, the SNI group, is owned by the royal family.  The SNI 
revenues alone have at times reached as much as 8 percent of the nation’s annual GDP.  The 
royal family owns a mutual fund that is made up of nine dummy companies, the most famous of 
which is called Siger, or “regis” (king) spelled backward.  The CEO of this company is also the 
king’s private secretary and a very close personal associate.  As an added cue regarding the royal 
family’s economic power, a U.S. diplomatic cable that became public in 2010 via WikiLeaks 
quoted a prominent businessman reporting that Morocco’s major investment decisions are 
essentially made by three individuals—the king, his long-time friend and former interior 
minister, and the CEO of Siger.  For several years until 2009, the royal businesses were required 
to keep transparent financial records in order to comply with the rules regarding publicly traded 
companies.  Inconveniently for the monarch, these records divulged that since his ascendance to 
power, the royal group’s profit and the dividends earned by the royal family increased nearly 
sevenfold.  This phenomenon triggered a series of distasteful press coverage which prompted 
Siger and its eight sister companies to engage in the nation’s biggest ever buyout in 2010 in 
order to go private.  The companies bought up their own groups’ shares, exited the stock market, 
and relieved themselves of the transparency requirements.  This act further attests to the 
economic power held by the king and his associates.  Thus the very top crust of Morocco’s rich 
is made up of none other than the royal family itself.  Tying this fact back to economic theories 
on the effects of free trade and liberalization, one can infer that the U.S.-Morocco FTA is likely 
to keep further empowering the monarch.   
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In addition to enhancing the economic power of the monarch, the FTA also indirectly 
strengthens the political support for the makhzen causing it to remain unthreatened by popular 
forces that call for democracy.  This too, is due to the elitist ramifications of the FTA.  As 
mentioned already, scholars have explained the results of globalization and free trade in 
developing countries as being heavily tilted, benefiting only the top socio-economic layers of 
society.  In Morocco, since the time of independence, the monarchy has ensured that the bulk of 
wealth remain concentrated among two small factions of society—the traditional rural notability 
and the urban Fassi community.
86
  As of 1956, the former group consisting of about 7,500 
individuals controlled a quarter of cultivable land in Morocco.  The latter group, which made up 
only 15 percent of the urban population, controlled most of the country’s economic activities 
other than agriculture.  When the colonial population exited the country its assets were 
transferred to these elite, which naturally led to their strong alliance with the monarch.  Since 
then, these major economic actors have had a stake in the upkeep of the monarch because of the 
intertwinement of their wealth with the makhzen.  Over time, the monarch has further intensified 
this symbiotic relationship and consequent political support from this sector by heavily 
encouraging elite investment in the Moroccan economy as well as prebendalism.
87
  The theory of 
prebendalism, originating from Richard A. Joseph’s study of Nigerian democracy, holds that 
state offices can become sources of material benefits for office holders, and can be appropriated 
as such.
88
  Officials then generate such benefits not only for themselves but also for their 
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constituencies or support groups.  The relevance of all this is that economic reforms yielding 
benefits for the elite also result in increased political support for the monarch, again making the 
U.S.-Morocco FTA a major source of regime maintenance.     
 
Security, War on Terrorism, Military 
Studies on U.S. military aid and internal security assistance have revealed that, in the 
cases where the recipient is a non-democratic or even transitioning regime, the aid ends up 
strengthening the ruling forces.
89
  This is partially because in non-democratic systems, the 
military and security forces are not subject to the kind of transparency and accountability that is 
required in democratic systems.  As a result, these forces often become power tools at the 
disposal of the authoritarian regime, and can be used for more than purely security purposes, 
including the containment of opposition or pro-democracy movements.  It is not uncommon for 
such movements to get tagged as security threats or terrorist in nature, thereby legitimizing their 
curtailment.  Such regimes also benefit from the fact that the United States is often unable to 
implement thorough vetting processes—especially in the MENA—to ensure that the recipient 
government refrain from using its improved capabilities for un-democratic ends.  This is because 
in this region in particular, it is in the vital interests of the United States to help curb militancy 
and terrorism, at any cost including the compromise of democratic values.  Such priorities have 
therefore led policymakers to empower the military forces of key allies such as Morocco, in 
order to improve their interoperability with U.S. counter-terrorism measures.  Also in return for 
such support, the superpower gains access to Moroccan ports, and other forms of operations in 
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the country.   However, a key consequence of this policy is that it also improves the regime’s 
ability and effectiveness in repressing pro-democracy forces.   
This phenomenon is enhanced in countries like Morocco because the military and 
security forces are headed by none other than the king himself, who is the commander-in-chief.  
Moreover, the institutional structure is such that they are not accountable to any other entities 
besides the Makhzen and their interests are essentially tied to the interests of the king.  
Therefore, military and security assistance from the United States also bolsters the power of the 
palace.  While this contradicts the highly promoted democratization cause, the superpower 
nevertheless sees bigger stakes in enhancing the might of the regime in order to foster increased 
cooperation on a number of fronts.  For this reason, the United States has in the last decade 
elevated its military assistance to Morocco, which is briefly described below. 
While the overall U.S. involvement with Morocco experienced a steep hike post-9/11, the 
military component alone rose to $20 million in the early to mid-2000s.  This was further 
enhanced by designating Morocco as a major non-NATO ally in 2004, which makes the country 
eligible for additional perks from the United States.  The country has also been harnessed into 
NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and has joined the Operation Active Endeavor which involves 
monitoring the Mediterranean for terrorist activities. It has regularly hosted and participated in 
NATO military exercises.  The U.S. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is yet 
another platform where Morocco collaborates and receives American assistance.  In 2007, the 
U.S. Department of Defense authorized a Foreign Military Financing (FMF) sale to Morocco 
including aircraft, equipment, and related services for $2.4 billion.  Morocco signed a contract 
for this with Lockheed-Martin in 2008.  According to officials in the Pentagon, this would 
enhance Morocco’s capability to support the U.S. war on terrorism and will contribute to 
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America’s main national security and foreign policy objectives.  In addition to technology and 
equipment, there have also been numerous training efforts and bilateral exercises.  Morocco is 
one of the top twenty recipients worldwide of the International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) program, which provides higher level training to Moroccan military officials on U.S. 
soil.
90
  Like icing on the cake, Morocco is also one of the top five recipients of Excess Defense 
Articles grants—which supply rather abundantly military trucks, tracked vehicles, and other 
equipment.  The list of such good grace and defense assistance from the United States to 
Morocco has been growing over the recent years to include highly sophisticated war games such 
as Phoenix Express and African Lion in collaboration with the kingdom’s Royal Armed Forces.  
What is of interest here is not so much the absolute extent of U.S. assistance as the relativity of 
it.  That is to say, Morocco is among those few chosen regimes that receive such special support 
despite the contradiction such support with the U.S. democracy promotion rhetoric.   
However, in explaining such bolstered security aid to Morocco, U.S. government 
officials have described it as support for Morocco’s legitimate need for its own self-defense.91  
This makes one wonder exactly how much of a security threat there really is to Morocco—the 
kind of threat to the country beyond just the government.  Granted that terrorism has been an 
issue that has surfaced every few years, its magnitude has not been such that it would require the 
kind of military and security assistance that is given by the United States.  There is also the 
question of possible conflict with Algeria.  However, with the two countries being U.S. allies in 
the war on terrorism, it is highly unlikely that the United States or NATO would allow an armed 
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conflict at such a time that would seriously disrupt regional stability.   In other words, threats to 
Morocco in the conventional warlike sense are not significant at present.  Yet the monarch has 
acquired weapons worth billions of dollars, thanks to the special relationship with the United 
States, at a time when Morocco’s national budget deficit underwent a steep climb.  This only 
alludes to one thing—such military engagement with the superpower is a means of keeping it 
committed to supporting the regime.  In turn, the United States too benefits from a persistently 
friendly monarchy that moves in concert with its own national interests, be it in its fight against 
radical Islamism, terrorism, and not in the least with regards to Israel which will be discussed in 
the following chapter.  It should be noted that Morocco’s acquisitions of U.S. military assistance 
also benefit the U.S. defense industry, which could be attributed to the influence of the military-
industrial-complex that is often mentioned in theories on U.S. foreign policy.
92
  To the 
superpower, this policy of active and increased military and security assistance to Morocco is yet 
another means of accentuating the symbiotic relationship with one of the most congenial MENA 
regimes.  This is a classic case of what scholars call regime maintenance, which ironically takes 
place in conjunction with “democracy” promotion. 
 
The Western Sahara Issue 
Not entirely unconnected with the security policy of the United States vis-à-vis Morocco, 
there is also the issue of Western Sahara regarding which the monarch enjoys a significant 
degree of passive support.  The Sahel region in general has been a topic of nervousness for the 
U.S. government.  This is due to its low population density, permeable borders, and the resulting 
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vulnerability to radicalization and terrorist activities.  This fear overrides the support for 
democracy and concerns for human rights, and hence the United States has long ignored the 
questionable policies of the Moroccan government regarding the Western Sahara issue, within 
this territory as well as in the country in general.  For example in Morocco, criticism of the 
monarchy’s policies toward this desert region is not tolerated to any degree.  Public expression or 
demonstrations on this issue are unthinkable.  International press and human rights groups are 
prevented from entering the territory or gaining a full view of this problem.  Even more serious 
are the reports obtained by the U.S. State Department pertaining to torture, beatings, and possible 
disappearances in the region, which are allegedly carried out by the country’s security forces.  
While there has been a strong expression of concern by the U.S. government, there have not been 
any pressure tactics or punitive actions exerted over the Moroccan regime.  During the 1990s 
Algerian crisis, the United States could not afford any kind of instability in its main ally in the 
Maghreb and so the status-quo was preferred in Western Sahara.  But even in the current 
decade—the era of heightened democracy promotion—the undemocratic aspects of the situation 
has been broadly ignored.   Save for the 2012 conditionality applied on a component of the 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), there has not been any serious effort to urge its ally to adopt 
democratic policies on this matter.  Even this conditionality pertains to the easing of human 
rights violations and brutal oppression, and no more.  Perhaps responding this conditionality or 
perhaps out of his own initiative, the king has undertaken since 2007 some degree of 
decentralization and improved rights for the Saharawi population.  This has not gone un-praised, 
but this ends the scope of the carrot and the stick that the United States could employ in a more 
serious democracy promotion effort in Morocco. 
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The United Nations has for many years called for holding a referendum to determine 
whether the Western Sahara would obtain independence or come under Moroccan sovereignty.  
In the early 2000s, the U.S. government supported this plan.  However, there were conceptual 
disagreements between the Moroccan government and the Polisario,
93
 especially with regards to 
the electorate that would participate in the referendum.  Each group wished to carve out the 
voting population in a way that would guarantee its own victory.  The referendum has therefore 
been stalled over the years.  But in response to nudges from the United States, the king charted a 
proposal in 2007 that would grant autonomy to Western Sahara, although ultimate sovereignty 
would still remain with the palace.  Foreign policy and defense would be under the control of the 
Moroccan government.  This has not been acceptable to the Polisario and the Saharawi people 
who demand sovereignty.  The United States however has welcomed and supported this plan, 
though in a very confusing manner.  On the one hand, U.S. officials have often announced that 
they do not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the territory.  At the same time, they have 
repeatedly praised and supported the king’s autonomy plan which indeed gives the monarchy 
sovereignty over Western Sahara.  Likewise, the U.S. policy regarding the usage of its economic 
aid to Morocco has been equally ambivalent.  Until 2012, Morocco was not authorized to apply 
U.S. economic aid to Western Sahara, as that would indicate that the United States officially 
recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the region.  But recently, as indicated by the 2012 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, this policy appears to have changed.  Here, it is stated that 
U.S. economic assistance funds can be used in all of Morocco including its territories.  This 
would make Western Sahara an eligible region.  But again, State Department officials have 
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reiterated that U.S. regulation on the usage of funds is not likely to change from what it has been 
in the past—in reference to this region.  Ultimately, U.S. policies pertaining to this issue have 
reflected a passiveness or indifference, which is inconsistent with the democracy promotion 
philosophy.   
Additionally, I argue that the “indifference” demonstrates a clear pro-regime leaning on 
the part of the U.S. government.  An examination of Congressional Research Reports as well as 
minutes from the 2007 session of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs divulges a soft corner 
in the United States for the king’s position on the even though there have been reports of human 
rights violations and repressive policies.  Officials have rationalized their partiality by 
considering the Western Sahara issue a serious security threat to Morocco, and as a patron 
superpower, it is only natural that full support be given to the king’s detailed autonomy plan, 
which the U.S. government has called highly credible and desirable.  On the same note, Polisario 
has been described as insincere and not so credible in its version of a proposed solution.  This 
very pro-monarch leaning of the United States is summarized in a statement in a 2012 
congressional research report noting that U.S. officials prefer a solution to the Western Sahara 
conflict that would not threaten King Mohammed VI’s rule.  For this reason, Washington 
believes in and supports the king’s autonomy plan, in which the sovereignty would remain with 
the monarchy. 
 
Conclusion 
For the Moroccan regime, its special relationship with the United States has been 
tantamount to foreign insurance for its survival and international legitimacy and helps offset the 
growing deficit of domestic goodwill.  Also, the anti-terrorism policies bolstered by U.S. 
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assistance serve to thwart or contain the domestic opposition to the authoritarian rule and its 
support of U.S. policies that contradict popular Moroccan sentiments.  In addition, through its 
co-participation in U.S. and NATO military and security strategies in the west Mediterranean 
region, the regime gets an opportunity to underline its importance to the West thereby qualifying 
it for continued U.S. and European support.  The FTA and other U.S. economic assistance 
programs are examples of this phenomenon, as argued above.   
From the U.S. perspective, this position of the monarchy perfectly suits its needs and 
interests in MENA.  Thus the symbiosis persists between it and the Moroccan monarch, which 
ultimately strengthens and maintains the regime, and also allows it to continue its rule in the 
disputed territory of Western Sahara.  Inconsistently with its proclaimed exportation of 
democracy to Morocco, the United States is heavily invested in the upkeep of the authoritarian 
ruler.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN MOROCCO 
 
Introduction 
Succeeding King Hassan II just before the increased U.S. involvement with Morocco, 
King Mohammed VI ascended the throne in 1999.  He proceeded with what seemed like an 
agenda of liberalizing—perhaps politically, perhaps economically, or both.  As a signal to 
domestic as well as international observers, of his intent to bring positive change to the country 
and to relax the tight authoritarian grip held by the palace during his father’s rule, the king 
dismissed the nearly invincible and extremely unpopular Minister of Interior Driss Basri.  
Coinciding with the higher emphasis placed by the United States on democratization of MENA 
states, he began introducing a number of changes and reforms in the country.  Among the most 
lauded endeavors are the Instance Equité et Réconciliation (IER) and the changes to the Family 
Code or Moudawana, which will be discussed in this chapter.   
The monarchy has also heightened the importance given to parliamentary elections.  In 
addition to these efforts, there have been a number of measures in the area of political 
liberalization in the parliamentary and judicial structures, as well as the constitution itself in 
2011.  This portfolio is rather impressive for an authoritarian regime in MENA, and has been 
highly encouraged as well as facilitated by the United States as discussed in Chapter 2.  The 
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monarch in turn has received a friendly response from abroad, with both Moroccan and foreign 
governments constantly reiterating to the world the significance of these reforms in terms of 
democratic progress and transition.  
 In this chapter, I analyze the three main reform initiatives mentioned above, and their 
relationship to bringing actual democracy, followed by a discussion on the implications of a 
democratic Morocco to U.S. interests in MENA.  The conclusion that emerges from the analysis 
is twofold:  first, the political liberalization in Morocco is not sufficient to lead to transition to 
democracy and, on the contrary, solidifies authoritarian power; secondly, given the U.S. interests 
in the region and domestic politics surrounding Washington, the superpower could not possibly 
desire a Moroccan transition to democracy nor are its policies toward this ally truly designed to 
influence such a breakthrough. 
 
Examining Political Liberalization and Reforms 
Instance Equité et Réconciliation (IER) 
In their 2005 study, Charles Kenney and Dean Spears analyzed the effects of truth 
commissions on democracy.  Focusing primarily on South American cases, these scholars found 
a statistically significant relationship between truth commissions and lasting democracy.  The 
commissions appear to have an enduring positive effect on all levels of democracy.
94
  According 
to John Hursh, this finding although distant from the MENA, is encouraging as one considers the 
IER initiative undertaken by the king of Morocco in 2004.
95
    As the U.S. government was 
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increasing its democracy assistance and promotion in Morocco and as the FTA was being 
negotiated as a means of strengthening the relationship between the two entities, the monarch 
launched this truth and reconciliation commission to account for and rectify the past mistakes of 
the state.  The goal of this was to reconcile and compensate state violence from the time of 
independence until the end of Hassan II’s rule.  As an added symbol of justice, former leftist 
political prisoner Driss Benzekri was appointed to head the commission along with sixteen other 
human rights activists and former prisoners.    
This truth commission was a landmark achievement for the king because this was the first 
and only such state endeavor in all of MENA.  The IER investigated over 20,000 cases of human 
rights abuses, and nearly 13,000 victims were offered financial reparations.  Moreover, according 
to the commission’s spokespeople, they received almost total cooperation from public 
institutions and security forces.  These state entities granted almost full access to information and 
complied with any request for assistance.  With such favorable conditions, one might regard this 
initiative as a long stride toward democratization of the country.  However, other realities have 
marred the scope of this groundbreaking effort.  First, the commission only considered human 
rights violations only until 1999 when the current king ascended the throne.  Therefore it did not 
necessarily subject the current monarch to such accountability, which arguably constitute a more 
authentic stepping stone to democracy.  Second, there is no law that binds the state institutions to 
provide information and cooperation as needed by the commission, and it is owing to the king’s 
support of the IER that such compliance was available.  Third, such a grandiose and truly 
laudable step toward democratization has been simultaneously counteracted by the resumption of 
state abuses and human rights violations in the post-Hassan II era.   Such actions peaked after the 
terrorist attacks on Casablanca in 2003, when thousands of Islamists were arrested without due 
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process and tortured by state security forces.  Such conflicting trends suggest that the truth 
commission was a tentative step rather than a deep-rooted one toward democratization.  
However, the IER achieved its goal of providing social catharsis to some degree, appeasing the 
perpetually frustrated population.  
In spite of its weakness in effecting democratic change, the IER has carried much value 
for two main entities—the monarch and the U.S. government.  For the former, this earned 
international praise as a democratizing king, and consequently reinforced material as well as 
political support from the West.
96
  For the latter, the IER came as an asset perfect for 
“impression management” especially among the displeased MENA population.97  As the United 
States has been increasingly viewed and despised as a supporter of oppressive Arab autocrats, 
this move by the Moroccan king has served as a rebuttal to such assertions, by demonstrating 
that the superpower is indeed true to its rhetoric of promoting democracy in the region.  Beyond 
reasserting the legitimacy of U.S. policy and of the monarchy, the IER has done little in relation 
to promoting democracy and pluralism in Morocco.  This is not to deny the merit of this one act 
bringing justice and closure to victims of state abuse.    
To view this phenomenon within a theoretical framework however, I find it useful to 
again refer to Kenney and Spears.  Based on the results of their study, the authors conclude that 
the effects of truth commissions on democracy though significant could be fragile.  It is because 
such initiatives would operate amidst several structural and environmental variables depending 
on the contexts of a given state.  Such variables in the Moroccan case might include the limited 
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scope of the IER in terms of the eras it covered, the resumption of aggressive policies following 
a security crisis in the country, and the lack of laws that obligate state institutions including the 
palace to provide such justice to the population.   
 
Elections 
Moroccan Parliamentary elections have been among the areas that U.S. democracy 
assistance programs have heavily focused on.  The key mark of a pluralistic political system is 
after all the electoral process.  According to Thomas Carothers, the traditional scholars of 
democratic transitions hold “very high expectations for what the establishment of regular 
genuine elections will do for democratization.”98  Understanding the importance of this to his 
image as a democratizing monarch, the king allowed the first truly free Moroccan parliamentary 
elections to take place in 2002, in contrast to the controversial and rigged elections of the past.  
In theory, the monarch has placed a heavy emphasis on the electoral process, and has made 
considerable effort to publicly communicate its value to the democratization of Morocco as well 
as his own commitment to the cause.  Like the 2002 elections, the 2007 elections were also 
praised for their transparency.  In fact the latter elections were held under the auspices of 
heightened international—especially American—support and technical assistance.  The 
international monitors declared this round of elections to be as free and fair as can be found in 
any well-functioning democracy.  This came as a blessing for all those who have a vested 
interest in viewing the Moroccan government as one in steady transition.  However, a deeper 
look at the facts surrounding the Moroccan electoral process reveals the ambivalence treatment 
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of election, undermining their utility for change.  It also strongly indicates that a democratic 
transition is not necessarily what might result from holding these periodic elections.   
Contradicting his emerging image as a reformer promoter pluralism as opposed to the old 
school authoritarianism of King Hassan II, King Mohammed VI took a step backward after the 
2002 elections.  Instead of appointing the leader of the winning party as Prime Minister as had 
been the practice under his father’s “gouvernement d’alternance”, the new monarch acted 
autonomously from such constitutional constraints and instead appointed a technocrat for the 
position.
99
  The party that won the elections—the USFP— and some of the political elite of 
Morocco became irate and frustrated following this development.  After negotiating with the 
party for several weeks the king finally carried out a swapping strategy granting the Ministry of 
Justice portfolio to the winning party as compensation for its conceding the Prime Minister’s 
office to the appointed technocrat.   
These dealings bring two important points to the surface.  First, in spite of including the 
citizens in an electoral process, the king can choose how much of the results actually will affect 
governance. Secondly, with or without elections, the reins of the kingdom are held in the 
monarch’s hands, and the entire structure of government is fluid and can be tweaked in whatever 
ways the monarch deems appropriate.  In a converse example, following the protests in 2011 
known as the February 20
th
 movement, the king made some amendments to the constitution, 
including the requirement that he choose a Prime Minister exclusively from the winning party.
100
  
While this reversal sounds fantastic as a foundation for democracy, it also reiterates that it is up 
to the monarchy to make or break the foundation.   
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It is perhaps this non-committal nature of the political system that led to the steep fall in 
the voter turnout in the 2007 elections.  Although these elections have been internationally 
acknowledged as being highly transparent and free, it should be noted that the number of voters 
was at the lowest, with a 37% turnout.  Even more noteworthy is that one-fifth of the voters cast 
spoiled ballots, in some cases including anti-monarch notes, as a rebellion against the regime.  
Ironically, this was a time when the king, with the assistance and support of the United States 
had heightened the promotion of elections as a vital necessity for political reform in Morocco.  
Evidently the population did not see them as having much potential for change.  This is reflected 
in a survey conducted in 2007 by the Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco, as shown by 
James N. Sater.
101
  The results showed that among the Moroccan population, trust in unelected 
seats of power is greater than trust in elected bodies.  The survey indicates that while the general 
political awareness in the population is modest, there is an inherent understanding that true 
power rests with the non-competitive centers of power.  Moreover, this survey also points out 
that at the local level, the public’s primary concern is the realization of its immediate economic 
concerns as opposed to some abstract political ideals such as pluralism and the balance of 
powers.  It is no wonder then that the population’s attitude toward elections has been so 
indifferent and faith so low.   
In addition to this indirectly undermined position of the voting population, the 
government’s policies regarding political parties are in themselves counter-productive for the 
emergence of democracy in Morocco. The setup of electoral districts and proportional 
representation in Morocco is such that there is no leeway for the rise of a strong opposition 
                                                 
101
 Sater, Parliamentary Elections and Authoritarian Rule in Morocco, 391. 
67 
party.
102
  There also are new additional political parties created by the monarchy to which 
members from the country’s economic and political elite have been recruited.  According to 
Sater allegiance is diverted to such parties, or highly scattered, countering those opposed to the 
current system or in a position to win the absolute majority.  Such a fragmented arena impedes 
the scope of elections as an avenue for democracy.  Some parties have at times been nationally 
shamed for their alleged vote-buying while others have been generally ignored.
103
  This 
inconsistency in managing the party system contributes to the weakening of the democratic 
process rather than enhancing it. 
From these ongoing patterns in the system, politicians in Morocco have learned that 
reaching consensus with the palace is the only way of guaranteeing themselves a viable career in 
the government.  This became more evident than ever during the 2011 elections.
104
  As a result 
of the February 20
th
 movement, which might have in part been inspired by the Arab Spring in the 
east, the monarchy found itself in a somewhat vulnerable position, though not threatened.  
However, in line with his history of making reforms and liberalizing selected facets of the 
political system, the monarch responded to these calls for reform and made point-specific 
revisions to the Moroccan constitution.  It was during this concerning period for the palace, that 
the newly elected politicians entered the parliament with a unique opportunity to advance their 
powers vis-à-vis the executive branch.
105
  However, once in office, they appear to have retreated 
to more passive roles, once again illustrating that the electoral process, which has received 
significant U.S. assistance, is not necessarily paving the way for democracy in Morocco. 
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Moudawana 
In a case study on Iran conducted by the Initiative for Inclusive Security, it was found 
that the fight for equal rights for women in Iran was intertwined with the society’s broader 
struggle for the transformation of the country into a democracy.
106
  Perhaps the same could be 
said of Morocco, where for several years women’s groups and social activists had mobilized the 
society, demanding equal rights for women vis-à-vis men.  Although it should be noted that both 
culturally and politically Morocco has remained by far the least constricting on women in 
comparison with most of the MENA, it is the concept of demanding legislation for equality that 
is comparable in the two societies.  In Morocco, the cause had been taken up by various 
women’s groups and other social activists—male and female.  Therefore, when the king 
implemented reforms to the Moudawana (Family Code) in 2004, international politicians and 
analysts alike applauded what they considered a leap toward pluralism, and better yet, a 
testimony to the powers of civil society in bringing political change.  It validated the notion that 
has emerged from traditional democratic theory that civil society activism in a country 
predisposes it to democratization.
107
  Considering the already prevalent preference of the United 
States to focus its democracy promotion efforts in Morocco on a bottom-up strategy, the victory 
of the women’s rights movements reinforced the wisdom of such a strategy.  This U.S. 
perspective does not take into account a less optimistic body of studies regarding the value of 
civil society to democracy.  This literature places higher emphasis on a strong and un-fragmented 
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political party system.
108,109
  Moreover, in the case of reform to the Moroccan Family Code, the 
very premise that it is social activism that pressured the king is in itself flawed.   
It is true that the activists for several years worked for this cause and succeeded in 
mobilizing broad sections of the society.  In fact according to Francesco Cavatorta and Emanuela 
Dalmasso’s study, two major Moroccan feminist groups have confirmed that they relentlessly 
lobbied the government to improve and protect women’s rights.  However, given the structure of 
the Moroccan political system, it is naïve to conclude that such efforts could effect change in all 
areas of activism—constitutional changes or changes to the political system for example.  In fact, 
in Morocco, civil society organizations are required to obtain licenses in order to function 
without much interference from state forces.  The process of obtaining a license is complicated, 
and depends on the government’s will.  Being unlicensed, however, would imply lack of legal 
status, no reliable funding and resources, and possible dismantling by state forces.  In other 
words, the government seems to employ the carrot-and-stick method to ensure that civil society 
organizations operate within acceptable boundaries.  Therefore, I argue that if the women’s 
rights groups were indeed instrumental in the Moudawana reforms, this only because granting 
equal status to women vis-à-vis their male relatives is not a matter that is detrimental to any other 
aspects of the political system—notably, prevalent power structure.      
On the contrary, it should be noted that it was through the powers of the monarch—the 
non-democratic entity—that this reform materialized.  It was in the interest of the regime to 
advance women’s rights, something that is undoubtedly viewed as a watershed event in MENA 
by Western observers, garnering increased support from entities like the United States and the 
                                                 
108
 Ibid, 489.  
109
 Langohr, Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics, 181-204. 
70 
European Union.  On the domestic front, the reforms proposed by the king were faced with 
strong opposition from the Islamists.
110
  Fortunately for the women’s rights activists and the 
palace, the Casablanca bombings in 2003 stripped Islamists of their credibility and capabilities to 
oppose, clearing the path for the monarch to push through the changes without friction.  
Interestingly, Moroccan Islamists proved to be an adaptive lot, as they soon came around in their 
position and even supported the reforms, while all it took from the king was to present the new 
laws with reference to Islamic interpretations.  Cavatorta and Dalmasso have argued however 
that one of the reasons for this ideological shift is the fact that these reforms were the monarch’s 
pet-project.  It would have been politically unwise for the Islamists to continue opposing the new 
laws, only to alienate themselves from the power-center and risk becoming marginalized.   
What emerges from this analysis is that for a significant change to take effect, such as the 
Moudawana reforms, the monarch has to be a central force.  Enlightened policies conducted by a 
monarch exemplify enlightened despotism—even if in some way they promote a more 
democratic society—rather than political democratization.  Reforms targeting a specific social 
issue like gender equality may be democratic in character, but are hardly a prelude to a 
democratic transition.  As for civil society activism, the outcome may relate to whether or not 
there is an alignment of—or at least a lack of conflict of—interests between the monarch and the 
associations rather than the ability of organizations to pressure the ruler in favor of liberal 
outcomes.  The means of achieving the outcome is therefore not through a process of pluralism.  
Instead of pursing the more democratic channels, such as taking the issue to the parliament, the 
women’s rights activists bypassed all the elected institutions and lobbied the palace instead.  
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Therefore, the liberal outcome that was achieved in Morocco both reflected and reinforced the 
authoritarian nature of government.
111
 
 
Moroccan Democracy, an Asset or a Nuisance? 
The decade-long intensified U.S. democracy promotion and assistance, concurrent with 
Washington’s perpetual support for the authoritarian regime prompts one question:  what does 
the United States really aim for?  It is true that following the September 11
th
 attacks, the wisdom 
in Washington changed with regards to supporting undemocratic regimes in MENA, with the 
realization that perhaps only democracy would neutralize a vast hostile population.  Then came, 
the elections in some parts of the region, in which fiercely anti-Western and hardline Islamist 
parties experienced sweeping victories, while in other countries, Islamists already had 
popularity.
112
   
All of this prompts yet another question:  what would be the implications of democracy 
in Morocco to the United States when all else is equal?  There are two main areas of concern.  
One is the possible rise of hardline Islamists to power that are antagonistic to the United States.  
Second is the Israel factor.  As a democracy Morocco is almost certain to be less congenial to 
Israeli interests than as a pro-Western monarchy, whether Islamists or secular nationalists 
predominated.  Considering the centrality of Washington’s support—whether because of 
domestic politics or pursuit of strategic interests—for Israel, this would be as much 
Washington’s problem as it would be Tel Aviv’s.  In the following section, I discuss the scope of 
these two factors to impact U.S. interests. 
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The Islamist Question 
There is no doubt that recent years have seen a striking rise in the appeal of Islamism 
amongst the Moroccan population.
113
  According to most analyses, this is attributable to the 
increase in conditions of despair, such as socio-economic marginalization, and the state’s failure 
to bring about a decent quality of life.  In addition, the widespread opposition to the U.S. war on 
Iraq and U.S. policies toward Israel has accentuated the appeal of the Islamist message, which 
proclaims the movement as a force against such Western imperialism in the Islamic world.
114
  
But more importantly, where the government has failed to provide basic social security to the 
poor or even the lower middle-class, Islamists have filled the gap.  Through highly organized 
channels, these groups have set up what Jeremy Sharp calls “alternative state structures” that 
provide health care, education, and other services to fulfill the fundamental needs of society.
115
  
As a result, there is a widespread notion that it is the Islamic ethic of these groups that enables 
them to deliver to the needy, in contrast to the apparently less concerned elitist groups that 
incidentally happen to be more secular.  Impressed by such social dynamics of Islamists, there 
are sectors of the population other than the poor who have also come to view the Islamists as the 
reliable and compassionate groups.  It naturally follows then that the Islamist political positions 
are also deemed equally righteous.  This is reflected in the polls presented in Bruce Maddy-
Weitzman’s study.116  While 64 percent of the Moroccans held a favorable view of the American 
public as such, a striking 72 percent empathized with al-Qaeda’s goal to force the United States 
to withdraw from Muslim lands.  It should be noted however that this does not indicate support 
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for al-Qaeda itself, and only a very small number of respondents expressed support for attacks on 
American civilians.  But interestingly, more than half the population suspects that the 9/11 
attacks were an American or Israeli conspiracy.  From such data, it is logical to conclude that 
given democracy, Islamists would rise to power in Morocco. 
However, there is an interesting dynamic in Weitzman’s data on Morocco that questions 
this conclusion.  Simultaneously with the spread of Islamism, Berber activism has also been on 
the rise—reaching greater heights than ever in the recent years.  This group is opposed to 
Islamism in spite of being just as Muslim as non-Berber Moroccans.  This is not surprising 
considering that Islamism has inherently brought in a sense of pan-Arabism, which is much more 
noticeable in a country like Morocco whose population is not homogenously Arab and in which 
a non-Arab ethnic group has remained distinct in culture and identity.
117
  Islamist groups are 
often influenced by certain religious movements in the heart of the Arab MENA, with a 
commitment to Arabizing the society and state, thus undermining the Berber heritage of 
Morocco.
118
  As a result of the Islamists’ attempts to erode Morocco’s plural identity, the Berber 
movement is generally at odds with these groups.  Due to their opposition to Arabization’s 
takeover of society, they have gone so far as to empathize with the historical experience of Jews, 
and consequently in some cases expressing a sense of affinity to Israel.
119
  This data becomes 
relevant for the analysis of Islamism in Morocco, because around 40 to 45 percent of the 
population is not Arab, and Arabic is not its mother-tongue.  This is despite the Arabization of 
much of the Berber population in big cities.  These facts indicate that nearly half the population 
might potentially be mobilized against the rise of Islamists to power.  In addition to the Berbers, 
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there are also sectors in the broader population that are secular or at least not in favor of hardline 
Islamism.  Many non-secular Moroccans too oppose the Islamists’ opposition to the more 
inclusive sufi-inspired Moroccan Islam, and their fitting the country into the religious mold of 
imported versions from abroad. So there are enough data and evidence to believe that democracy 
in Morocco, unlike in certain other MENA states, may not necessarily result in a monolithic 
political system monopolized by Islamists.  Moreover, the 2007 elections in which the predicted 
victory of the Islamist party did not happen support this reasoning.  The citizens had the 
opportunity to give a sweeping victory to the Islamists, but they chose not to do so.  Even the 
ones who wished to demonstrate their outrage at the regime did so by spoiling the ballots rather 
than voting for the Islamists, who are the main opposition force in the country.  Although the 
Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party (PJD) did win the largest bloc of seats in the 
2011 elections, it failed to gain an absolute majority.     
 It is also noteworthy that the PJD is considered by scholars and analysts to be by far the 
most moderate in the MENA.
120
  Several scholars have noted that the Islamist movements in 
Morocco are the most liberal in the region, support the implementation of a pluralistic form of 
government, and are open to liberal reforms if they can be explained with some level of Islamic 
reference.
121
  The PJD has illustrated this point in the past by displaying its rational side along 
with its endorsement of Islamic values.  Hence there seem to be variables at play in the 
Moroccan case causing it to perhaps not completely fit the general patterns of the MENA, 
although the extent to which this is true—as well as the exact nature of such factors—awaits 
further studies.  Some scholars have attributed this to Morocco’s heterogeneous and adaptive 
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Islam as opposed to the more rigid or orthodox versions that undermine indigenous cultural 
influences.   
Although such data and analogy may be somewhat comforting, a rational United States 
would nonetheless be cautious in allowing democracy to take shape. While hardline Islamism 
may not be a certainty in the case of Morocco, it would be a risk all the same.  These possibilities 
are discussed in reports to Congress shedding light on America’s “Islamist dilemma” in 
Morocco.
122
  What might be a more certain outcome is that, Islamism or not, democracy would 
make opposition to specific American policies possible—such as to the war on Iraq in 2003, 
despite which the monarch remained cooperative and allied with the United States. Democracy 
would not allow for such unconditional cooperation, nor are Islamists the only faction opposed to 
the regime’s passiveness with regard to such Western policies.   It is no wonder then that the 
United States continues proclaim to promote democracy while providing ample support to the 
authoritarian regime.   
 
The Israel Factor 
When analyzing the prospects of democratization of the MENA one cannot ignore the 
Israel factor.  This is particularly true for U.S. policymakers.  It is because the projected 
ramifications for Israel are likely to bind the United States in ways that determine its foreign 
policy choices.  This is supported by a vast body of literature that attests to the centrality of pro-
Israel interest groups in U.S. decision making on matters that have any relevance to 
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Israel.
123,124,125
  While there have been debates among scholars on the influencing capabilities of 
this lobby, there is enough evidence showing that policies that are undesirable to Israel are most 
likely to be shelved or sent to the back-burner in Washington, and that is the point of interest in 
this analysis.   
An illustration of Israel’s aversion toward Arab democracy is seen in Israeli reactions to 
the events of the Arab Spring in late 2010 and early 2011.  One of the central themes of Israel’s 
most prominent annual political gathering—the Herzliya Conference—that year, was hostility to 
the idea of Arab democracy.
126
  Emphasizing the importance of maintaining the status-quo in 
certain Arab states, one Israeli Major General, “In the Arab world, there is no room for 
democracy.”  Another high ranking Israeli official even complained that the United States has 
“become an agent of revolutionary change in the Middle East, at the expense of stability.”  These 
sentiments echoed several other such declarations of concern and discontent—the most 
significant of which came from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—regarding any semblance 
of democratization in the region, and more particularly the fall of existing authoritarian 
regimes.
127
   
It follows that in the case of Morocco, if the U.S. policy is aimed at bringing a change in 
the political system where the power is significantly devolved from the monarch, then it would 
indirectly be unfavorable to Israeli interests.  One of the most prevalent sentiments regarding the 
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superpower in the MENA is the resentment toward the unconditional U.S. support for Israel.
128
  
In addition, Moroccan leaders have faced strong domestic opposition to having any kind of 
relations with the Jewish state.  This animosity toward Israel is not confined to Islamists or those 
with greater Islamic tendencies.  Opposition to Israeli policies is almost unanimous, though it 
should be noted that Moroccans are not unfriendly to Jews as such, especially to ones who share 
their origins.  Scholars have also noted that Morocco has a history of pluralism that has allowed 
thousands of Jews to live in genuine freedom in the country.
129
  Therefore anti-Semitism as such 
may not be a concern for U.S. interest groups or policymakers. However hostility toward Israel, 
particularly Zionism, would be certain to come to the surface and affect the regime’s position on 
Israel if Morocco were to become a democracy.  But thus far, authoritarianism has stood as a 
wall between the angered MENA populations and policies on Israel.      
It is an open secret that he Moroccan regime maintains relations with Israel, which is 
unsurprising for at least one reason.  As Mohameden Ould-Mey has described, when it comes to 
seeking friendly relations with the United States, there is a “Coriolis Force of Normalization 
with Israel.”130  Originally an expression in the field of geography, the phrase is used by Ould-
Mey to describe what appears to be a precondition for Mauritania to have normalized relations 
with the United States—that is, normalized relations with Israel.  A similar point is made by 
Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, that Morocco has been aware that the road to Washington gets 
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smoother if it passes via Jerusalem.
131
  It is thus fully understandable that the Moroccan 
monarchs remain cordial toward Israel. 
The Moroccan regime’s “special relationship” dates back to independence.  But this is 
strictly limited to the regime level in this Arab state.
132
 Geographically the most distant from the 
Middle East conflict, Morocco has been described by many as Israel’s closest friend in the Arab 
world.
133
  A point of unique significance—for an Arab state—is that one of the senior advisors to 
the king is a Moroccan Jew who has links with Israeli officials.
134
  This Moroccan trend of 
forging relations with Israel was enhanced by King Hassan II, who in a break with “Arab 
solidarity on Palestine” even held a public meeting once with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon 
Peres at the royal palace in Morocco.
135
   The monarch also played an active role in mediating 
talks between Israeli and Palestinian leaders, encouraging the Middle East process.  By 1994, an 
Israeli mission and liaison offices—though not technically a full-fledged embassy—were set up 
in Morocco.  Since the current monarch ascended the throne, he has followed in his father’s 
footsteps by maintaining these ties with Israel.  Outwardly however, diplomatic relations were 
severed in October 2000, following the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada.  But again, 
beginning in 2003, there have been diplomatic visits and meetings between Moroccan and Israeli 
officials.  These have been mostly unpublicized in the kingdom due to domestic disapproval.
136
   
In one high profile instance, indirectly snubbing Iranian President Mahmud 
Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust-questioning Muslim solidarity statements, the king authorized a 
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speech for a Paris ceremony read in his name, acknowledging the evils of the Holocaust. Carol 
Migdalovitz’s congressional research report notes that this landmark speech was a phenomenon 
coming from the Arab world, where no leader has publicly taken such a stand regarding the 
Holocaust.
137
  This too is contradictory to popular Moroccan opinion.   Maddy-Weitzman’s data 
shows that the Moroccan people disapprove of evoking memories of these World War II events 
in the media because of the sympathy it fosters for Israel at the expense of the Palestinians.
138
       
 Morocco is of particular interest to Israel also because of its genetic and cultural 
affiliations with Israel.  At present, some 600,000 Israelis are of Moroccan origin most of whom, 
maintain ties with the home country.  One could attribute a sense of dual nationality to this 
population.  Any given year, nearly half that number travel to Morocco.
139
  In addition, Morocco 
itself has around 5,000 Jews who live in free conditions while maintaining ties with Israel. This 
data on Jewish presence in Morocco is without taking into account the emigrants in France and 
Canada (Quebec) many of whom have connections with the country also.  Such factors makes 
Moroccan politics an area of concern for Israel and consequently for U.S. policymakers.  After 
all, it is possible that, at times of heightened Israeli aggression in Palestine, the Moroccan 
population’s normally neutral disposition toward Jews could make way for hostile feelings 
toward those with Israeli ties.   
It becomes evident then, that a democratically elected Moroccan government would 
likely not maintain such amicable ties with Israel—officially or unofficially.   It also follows that 
it would not cooperate with the United States to the extent that the monarchy does, in light of the 
continual U.S. support for Israel and Moroccan public’s disapproval of it.  In addition, domestic 
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pressures in the United States would also oppose the facilitation of a political system in Morocco 
that would threaten the privileges historically enjoyed by Israelis in the kingdom.  Hence the 
only option all of this leaves for U.S. policymakers is to maintain the status-quo to some level, 
which contradicts the democracy promotion policy.  Thus a hybrid policy that proclaims support 
for democratization but is heavily tilted toward regime maintenance becomes the viable solution.   
 
Final Analysis 
The American Role in Moroccan Democracy 
The above analysis explains the reasons for the United States to be conservative in its 
promotion of democracy in Morocco.  These factors pose a conflict of interests to U.S. 
policymakers.  Referring to Michael Barnett's application of the constructivist framework to 
explain Arab politics, I find a number of parallels in the U.S. involvement with Morocco.  On the 
one hand, realpolitik would call for the maintenance of the monarch who has been consistently 
cooperative especially international affairs, and is viewed as the only assurance for regional 
stability. On the other hand, the United States is in need, now more than ever, to construct an 
image of itself as an altruistic force in the MENA, committed to causes such as liberalizing the 
disenfranchised populations of the region.  This has become a particular necessity for the sake of 
mending some of the serious damage to its reputation among the Arab public due to its track-
record of supporting autocrats who have not met the demands and needs of the populations.  For 
this, Washington has assumed the role in Morocco as a patron of democracy.  One of the primary 
goals here is also to demonstrate to the rest of MENA its intent and ability to bring positive 
change in the region and the appearance of supporting democracy builds support at home for 
Washington’s Middle East policies.  This however is not Washington’s only role, as is evident 
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from the facts analyzed in the chapter titled “Maintenance of the Moroccan regime”.  This is also 
not a very feasible role if concerns on Islamism and Israel are taken into account, as discussed 
above.  Thus the superpower appears to have fallen in a “symbolic entrapment”.  It is constricted 
by its own normative rhetoric about its mission of supporting democracy and is therefore forced 
to juggle between policies of reason and policies of altruism.
140
     
Chapter 2 demonstrated that much of the U.S. support for political reform is concentrated 
on the non-institutional layers of society.  It is often described by officials in the U.S. 
government as a bottom-up approach, with references to theories concerning the need for a 
strong civil society in order to facilitate democracy.  However, it could also be argued that too 
much support for civil society could actually indirectly reinforce authoritarianism.
141
  These 
associations are often very narrow in focus and cause-specific.  Their primary goals are typically 
directed toward a single reform at a given time.
142
  Such policy changes could be just as well 
implemented by an authoritarian government as by a democratic one.  It is therefore not within 
the scope of these organizations to bring dynamic changes to an entire political system.   
By enhancing the Moroccan society’s ability to organize in associations, the United 
States helps pockets of the population resolve their local issues and realize basic needs.  It has 
been noted by scholars that in the opinion of a vast portion of the population, the most important 
role of the government is to address society’s economic needs, and implement policies 
accordingly.  It is not so much their concern that it be done by an elected leader as opposed to an 
autocrat.  It follows then that by implementing programs for improving the basic quality of life 
for these masses, and helping to implement policies that address some of their fundamental 
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needs, the United States helps the Moroccan monarch eliminate some serious grievances against 
the government.  This would also decrease society’s urge to push for a systemic change that 
would destabilize the current order in the region.  In addition, these actions compete with the 
services rendered by Islamists.  Therefore, an indirect effect of the American bottom-up strategy 
could be the gradual depletion of the anti-U.S. sentiment, and consequently the Islamist appeal in 
the long run.  These I argue might be the bigger motives in U.S. policy than a full Moroccan 
transition to democracy in the short run.      
On another level, the United States provides significant “democracy” assistance to 
liberalize Morocco’s political institutions as well.  The electoral process, political parties, and the 
judicial sector have enjoyed considerable U.S. support, as was discussed in the Chapter 3. 
However, it should be noted that in the Moroccan political system, real power is concentrated 
around the king and the appointed technocrats or royal affiliates.  While the lower house of the 
parliament—the only directly elected body—has legislative powers, most major reforms or 
legislations have come down as royal decrees from the king himself.  Therefore, providing 
support to these state institutions is not tantamount to paving the road for democracy.  Some 
degree of political liberalization might be achieved, as has been the case in Morocco.  The king 
has recently accorded increased powers and capabilities to the Prime Minister, in addition to 
binding himself to appoint a leader from the winning party in parliamentary elections.  However 
these are what scholars have described as cosmetic changes, of a “managed democracy,” and 
typically do not lead to a full democracy.  Sater explains that political liberalization that occurs 
where the economic and political elite are in alliance with the broader population can lead to 
democracy.  However, democracy is not likely to follow political liberalization in societies 
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where the economic and political elites are in alliance with the regime.
 143
  In the Moroccan case, 
as discussed in the Chapter 3, the elite alliance is with the monarch.  Thus while it suits the 
interests of all parties—the United States, the Moroccan public, and the monarchy—to improve 
the certain democratic institutions within this authoritarian system, it does not endanger regional 
stability, which appears to be a more pressing U.S. goal for the short run.     
It therefore seems that, what are called U.S. democracy promotion policies are actually 
policies that help the regime appease a disenfranchised population that might someday organize 
and overthrow it or carry out a revolution as in Iran and, more recently, some Arab countries.  By 
periodically addressing the population’s grievances, and by maintaining some kinds of 
liberalization, the monarch may succeed in preventing regime destabilization.  Borrowing from 
Daniel Brumberg and Glenn E. Perry’s similar arguments on MENA regimes, these changes or 
improvements are only superficial compared to the big picture, and by implementing political 
liberalization as a substitution, the Moroccan regime can forestall a complete transition.
144,145
  
The outcome is in alignment with U.S. interests of regional security and Morocco’s stability, 
hence the continued support for such controlled political reform. 
 
The Illusion of Democratic Gradualism 
One might suppose that the democratic transition in Morocco is not designed to be a 
rapid one, and that the Western patrons promote the idea of gradualism.  In fact policymakers in 
the United States and European Union are supporters of this notion.
146
  This could be a 
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delusional view as all the changes that have been promoted or have taken place have reinforced 
the current institutions.  The February 20
th
 movement for example called for three things:  a 
parliamentary monarchy; separation of powers; and accountability of those in power.  In 
response to these demands, and as a preemptive measure following revolts in Tunisia and Egypt, 
the monarch addressed all three of these demands.  As per the revised constitution that received 
an unusually high percentage of votes in the referendum that followed, the king abandoned the 
“sacredness” clause, at least in the French version of the constitution.147  He implemented a 
relatively more democratic form for the Prime Minister’s office.  Finally, the new constitution 
cuts official ties between judges and the Judicial Ministry.  However, Ahmed Benchemsi has 
noted that upon a closer look the most significant autocratic elements remain despite these 
revisions.
148
  The monarchy’s monopoly over power still prevails.  On the other hand these 
reforms have been described by the U.S. government, as a sign of Morocco’s steady strides 
toward democracy.  Here, I argue that these reforms have only put to rest some of the vivacity of 
the movement.  The regime in effect made deals with the population, buying back some of the 
lost legitimacy.  The overarching system however carries on.  The Moroccan political system 
seems to function in such a way that the critical mass usually required for a transition to occur 
may never be attained.  Hence the notion of gradualism is not an assuring one, as there are many 
signs indicating that a real transformation to democracy is not likely happen within the present 
scheme of things. 
It should also be noted that the stability of the monarchy is not solely a result of Western 
support or autocratic policies.  Despite the grievances in society, and mass opposition to the 
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status-quo, there is a widespread sense of legitimacy accorded to the Moroccan king.  This sets 
the monarchy apart from authoritarian regimes in Arab republics.  The title “Commander of the 
Faithful”—one of the titles given to caliphs from the seventh century on—that is established by 
the constitution, is a deeply rooted notion stemming from religious and cultural tradition.  This in 
itself makes the king a revered entity that the majority of the population may not attempt to 
overthrow.  In addition to this almost automatic source of legitimacy for tradition-minded 
segments of the population, the king has undertaken certain reforms that have carried highly 
symbolic value.  The dismissal of former Minister of Interior Driss Basri and the IER effort have 
illustrated to the population that this king cares for justice.  Therefore, the public’s grievances 
and opposition often are not aimed at uprooting the monarchy or at establishing popular control.  
Even the February 20
th
 movement, the biggest popular uprising against the government in recent 
times, did not call for regime change.  The demands were centered on higher levels of pluralism 
not denouncing the powers of the monarch.  Therefore the legitimacy attributed to the king acts 
in confluence with U.S. and Moroccan efforts to appease the population with political reforms, 
preventing opposition movements from reaching a magnitude that might bring total change.   
 
Conclusion 
Responding to nudges from the United States to modify some of the authoritarian 
features in the kingdom coupled with sporadic domestic demands, the Moroccan regime has 
maintained a record of being a liberalizing one.  There have been efforts for better governance 
and increased representation such as the IER, reforms to the Family Code, and improvements to 
the electoral process for the parliament.  These have been regarded, and perhaps rightfully so, as 
landmark steps in improving the country’s political system and the quality of life for certain 
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marginalized segments of society.  These, along with a number of ongoing fringe reforms have 
also been described by U.S. and other Western officials as steady strides toward the 
establishment of a full-fledge democracy in Morocco.  The analysis in this chapter however 
shows that while individually these reforms have a liberalizing effect, they actually help 
consolidate the existing system, making it less vulnerable to any potential movement calling for 
democratization.  In addition, an analysis of the stakes and implications surrounding a Moroccan 
transition reveals that the United States would not likely seek such a transformation in the near 
future.  The U.S. policy toward Moroccan democratization is intertwined with two major factors:  
the specter of Islamism (or, for that matter, a secular nationalism, as in the past and, conceivably, 
the future) and the U.S.-Morocco-Israel triangle.   These factors are not likely to change 
drastically soon.  In conclusion, U.S. democracy promotion in Morocco is negated by fears of a 
real transition to democracy, while the superpower’s relationship with the monarch continues to 
reinforce the status of the authoritarian regime.     
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CHAPTER 5 
 
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Introduction 
This study has brought to light a number of points.  It confirms that many generalizations 
pertaining to U.S. involvement in the MENA apply to Morocco in particular.  For example, this 
case study reiterates the observations of Daniel Brumberg, Thomas Carothers, and Marina 
Ottaway, among others, that what the United States actually promotes in certain MENA states is 
a kind of political liberalization—some degree of contestation, which actually may strengthen an 
authoritarian regime as opposed to democratization.
149,150,151
   It also adds Morocco to the list of 
MENA countries where the United States experiences a tug-of-war between its altruistic image 
as a patron of democracy and the demands of realpolitik.
152
  However, an additional nuance that 
emerges is the possibility that U.S. “democracy promotion” initiatives at the bottom layers of 
society may not result entirely from Washington’s need to present a favorable image of itself.  
Rather, these might also be aimed at transforming the psychological orientation of the Moroccan 
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population in the long run vis-à-vis Islamists as well as the United States.  This will be 
elaborated in the following section, which highlights my findings. 
 
Key Observations 
Findings from Democracy Promotion, Regime Maintenance, and Moroccan Democratization 
The information presented in Chapter 2 on U.S. democracy promotion in Morocco reveal 
a number of points.  First, there is a strong tendency to emphasize certain social issues—e.g., 
gender equality and encouraging the formation and strengthening of “civil society” organizations 
– that do not necessarily undermine authoritarianism.  Second, there is considerable effort 
invested in improving Morocco’s existing pluralistic institutions, such as the electoral system 
and the parliamentary processes.  In addition, there has also been a stronger U.S. push for 
Morocco’s political liberalization and some devolution of power to lower levels of government.  
In effect, the U.S. policy in Morocco does call for a modestly higher level of democratization 
within the existing political framework, thereby fostering the legitimacy of the current ruler.  
However, I have also shown that, U.S. democracy promotion does not in fact address the 
establishment of democracy at the top. In other words, no part of the extensive data on U.S. 
assistance presented in Chapter 2 indicates policies that call for a systemic transition to 
democracy, which necessarily would involve transformation of the monarchy (if it is to be kept 
at all) into a formality on the model of, say, the British queen and allow full electoral 
contestation to determine who governs. 
The deficit in democracy is compounded by United States support for the regime, which 
empowers the monarch economically, politically, and militarily.  For example the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) is likely to benefit and economically strengthen the country’s elite, especially 
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the top crust, which, as shown in Chapter 3, is comprised of the royal family and its close 
associates. It also has the potential to exacerbate unemployment and poverty, marginalizing 
certain segments of the population.  Likewise, the extensive military and security assistance 
provided by the United States enhances the military might of the regime, considering that the 
monarch has nearly exclusive authority over the security forces.  In addition, U.S. support for the 
king’s autonomy plan in Western Sahara—retaining Morocco’s sovereignty over the territory—
reinforces the power of the monarchy and disregards the Sahrawi people’s aspiration for self-
determination. 
The liberalization initiatives that have been underway in Morocco appear impressive in 
themselves.  The current monarch has undertaken a series of unprecedented political reforms that 
make his policies unique in the region and have garnered praise from the West as representing 
democratization.  This began with the dismissal of a Minister of Interior who was much despised 
by the Moroccan population.  Next, the IER truth and reconciliation commission was a 
groundbreaking move for an Arab authoritarian ruler and stood out as the only one of its kind in 
the history of the MENA.  Reform of the Family Code or Moudawana laws was yet another 
watershed event in the region and also a perceived victory for civil society organizations that 
lobbied for this legislation.   The United States has supported and praised these moves, pressing 
the monarch to stay steady on this liberalizing path.  The king has also improved the functioning 
of the electoral system, with significant assistance and technical support from the United States.  
The parliamentary elections that have taken place since the current ruler ascended the throne 
have been ranked highly for their transparency and fairness.  
However, when all of this is viewed in the broader context of the political system, they 
reveal that the reforms do not change the basic political framework, as they have bypassed 
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allowing democracy from taking over the top layers of government.  This status-quo is further 
aided by the policies of the United States that empower the regime as well as remain passive 
regarding an actual transition to democratization.   
 
Concerns in Washington 
The U.S. preference for maintaining the status-quo is explained by two factors.  There is 
the fear of a possible Islamist takeover if democracy emerges.  This is in spite of signs that 
Moroccan Islamism may not be tantamount to an entirely anti-Western Islamic theocracy (which 
in recent years has come to be seen as the main anti-Western, anti-imperialist, nationalist force).  
Also, this is in spite of the evident heterogeneity in the population’s attitudes toward religion and 
pan-Arabism.  The question of Israel is another primary consideration in U.S. foreign policy in 
general, and therefore it follows that this would be a factor in policies toward Morocco as well.  
While the Moroccan monarchy has long maintained friendly—if secret—ties with Israel, this 
might not be the case if the country were to become a democracy.  Such a prospect presumably 
would impede Washington’s desire for any significant change in Morocco’s political system.  
Owing to these factors, it is not likely that U.S. policy will push for a transition to democracy 
under foreseeable circumstances.  However, based on the data presented in Chapter 2, I suggest 
that U.S. policies might be amenable to democratization in the long run, under other 
circumstances. 
While U.S. policymakers hold that empowering the disenfranchised population is a 
stepping stone in fostering the development of a strong civil society—considered essential for 
democracy building by many—there is also another parallel phenomenon that could be 
happening here.  It has to do with the rectification of discontent toward the West, in contrast to 
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the growing Islamist appeal.  Over the years, the necessities of the poorer segments of society in 
large part have been addressed by Islamist organizations via highly developed channels 
discussed in Chapter 4.  Basic health care, education, and other everyday needs have been 
provided for by these organizations, whereas the government has failed to meet such needs.  It is 
partly due to such charitable endeavors of the Islamists that their appeal has risen so drastically, 
tilting the political leanings toward them and away from the pro-Western factions and the less 
Islamic government.  In other words, pro-Western groups have appeared as hegemonic and self-
interested, while the Islamist groups appear to be servicing the society’s fundamental needs 
without any obvious vested interests.  Thus anti-U.S. sentiments have risen over time.  However, 
through social-assistance programs of the MEPI and USAID, as seen in Chapter 2, the United 
States could over time diminish the anti-U.S. sentiments.  In addition, by competing with the 
Islamists’ uplifting initiatives for Moroccan society, the superpower can also temper down the 
appeal of hardline Islamist groups.  It therefore emerges from this analysis that the so-called U.S. 
democracy promotion programs are more geared toward neutralizing an anti-U.S. and pro-
Islamist society in the long run so that the advent of a real democracy—if it were to come—
would not be so threatening to U.S. interests in the region.  This is the study’s nuanced version of 
the existing scholarly view that Washington’s democracy promotion initiatives are mostly a 
result of having to provide something to back up its pro-democracy rhetoric while its policy 
mostly focuses on empowering regimes.   
 
Conclusion 
 A number of themes and ideas have emerged from this thesis.  First, borrowing from 
Michael Barnett, America’s need for “impression management” in the MENA, particularly in the 
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post-9/11 world order, requires it to take on the altruistic role of a democracy promoter, although 
mostly in rhetoric.  Due to Morocco’s long-standing relations with the United States, the general 
Western view of Morocco as an accessible and moderate country, and its proximity to Western 
Europe, this North African state has become a prime target for the U.S. democracy promotion 
experiment.  Secondly, Washington’s altruistic role is incompatible with the dictates of political 
realism, which require sustaining the stability of the reliable ally—the monarchy.  Regional 
security concerns have prompted the United States to strengthen its relations with the regime, 
thereby further empowering it.  In addition, the fear of the possible rise of Islamists to power in a 
democratic Morocco adds to the U.S. hesitation to push for a full democracy.  Concerns over the 
Moroccan policy toward Israel, in the advent of democracy, is yet another factor contributing to 
this hesitation.  Thus, in the current scheme of politics, U.S. democracy promotion in Morocco 
remains largely in the realm of rhetoric, while it is inhibited in reality by conflicting interests.  
Yet, it is possible that the U.S. democracy promotion policy is at work for a larger interest—the 
transformation of the population’s psychology from the current degree of pro-Islamist and anti-
U.S. leaning to something more favorable.  This indeed would ease some of the inhibitions in 
Washington regarding the actual democratization of Morocco. 
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